The history of the Chinese Air Force in the war with Japan most resembles the legendary Phoenix, constantly rising from its ashes. Until 1942, Japanese aircraft virtually annually “smashed to smithereens” the Kuomintang aviation, yet the Chinese patiently restored their air force’s combat capability time and again.
Between 1937 and 1940, the Soviet Union was the primary supplier of what would become “aerial scrap metal,” sending 563 fighters (I-15, I-15bis, I-16, and I-153) and 322 bombers (292 SB, 24 DB-3, and 6 TB-3) on credit, totaling 200 million dollars. However, of the 250-300 combat aircraft supplied annually, only a few dozen remained airworthy by year-end.
Due to the Chinese Air Force’s complete inability to resist the Japanese, China’s Aviation Committee (AC) repeatedly ordered all its units to cease combat operations to preserve surviving aircraft. Some even attempted to save and hide them in disassembled form.
The story of the Soviet “Chaika” (I-153) fighters is the most illustrative in this regard. After the withdrawal of all Soviet volunteers from China (only a few advisors remained, not personally participating in battles), the very first “Zero” raid on Chongqing on September 13, 1940, became another “pogrom” for the Chinese Air Force. The fast Japanese fighters shot down 18 “Ishaks” (I-16) and 9 I-15bis without losses. The next day, the AC ordered the cessation of aerial combat.
By the end of the year, three squadrons of the “latest” I-153s (93 aircraft) arrived in China from the USSR. Chinese pilots mastered them in January-February 1941, but the very first battle over Chengdu on March 14 showed that the Chinese in their “Chaikas” were helpless against the Japanese “Zeros.” In that battle, known in China as “Battle 314,” 24 I-153s were lost and three more were damaged, while only four “Zeros” sustained minor damage.
Again, an order for the suspension of hostilities followed. Two months later, May 22 and 26 became “black” days for Chinese aviation. During “dispersal” and relocation to a “safe” airfield, the Japanese intercepted two groups of “Chaikas” (17 and 18 aircraft) and completely annihilated them; 15 were shot down, and the rest were destroyed on the ground during refueling. Most painfully, the Japanese again lost no aircraft. Against such a catastrophic backdrop, the Chinese military leadership decided to once again seek assistance from “Uncle Sam” overseas.
In the late 1930s, the USSR temporarily “eclipsed” the primary supplier of combat aircraft for Chiang Kai-shek’s aviation, the American company Curtiss. However, the strong ties with this firm, which originated at the turn of the century, were never truly broken. After the “Hawk” II and “Hawk” III biplanes, which formed the core of China’s fighter aviation by mid-1937, it was the turn of the “Hawk” 75 monoplane.
A demonstration model of the “Hawk” 75H with fixed landing gear was purchased in 1938 and became the personal aircraft of American AC advisor Claire Chennault. Chennault was involved in training Chinese pilots and, concurrently, lobbying for the supply of American aircraft. The “Hawk” 75M modification with retractable landing gear, specifically created for China, was not widely used in the war with the Japanese.
Despite 30 aircraft and 82 assembly kits being sent to China in the summer and autumn of 1938, the “Hawks” were planned to be assembled at an aircraft factory evacuated from Hangzhou to Leiyun. The location near the Burmese border on the eastern bank of the Ruilujiang River in Yunnan province seemed protected from Japanese raids at the time. However, they failed to truly master the assembly of “Hawk” 75Ms there, though, according to some data, 8 aircraft were assembled by October 1940 (before the Japanese bombed the factory). The fate of the remaining kits is unknown. Subsequently, the aircraft factory planned to organize the assembly production of the export version of the Curtiss-Wright CW-21 “Demon” light fighter; three such aircraft and 32 kits were ordered from the USA.
The factory in Leiyun operated until April 1942, when it had to be evacuated to Kunming due to a Japanese offensive. From 1943 to 1946, the Kunming aircraft factory, dispersed in the surrounding gorges, assembled an experimental batch of nine monoplane fighters, most likely from parts of “Hawk” 75M, 75A-5, and CW-21. The extent of their similarity to American prototypes and their further fate are unknown. In Western sources, the first example is listed under the strange index XP-0.
Early Resistance and Soviet Aid
The “Hawks” 75 fighting in China actively participated in battles but did not achieve significant success. On October 1, 1938, the 16th squadron of the 6th Bomber Aviation Group, which previously flew V-92 “Corsair” light bombers, was renamed a fighter squadron and immediately sent to Zhijiang (Hunan province) to receive nine “Hawks.” Pilots retrained under the guidance of Claire Chennault. By the end of the year, they were redeployed to Yibin (Sichuan province) for air defense of China’s provisional capital, Chongqing.
In January 1939, the squadron relocated to Kunming (Yunnan province), and in August, it was disbanded. The 18th squadron also belonged to the 6th Aviation Group until November 1, 1938 (flying “Douglas” O-2MS light bombers). After being renamed a fighter squadron, it received nine “Hawks” 75 and began independent retraining in Yibin.
On August 18, 1939, pilots of the 18th squadron first encountered the Japanese in the new “Hawks” in the air. In that very first battle, the squadron commander, Tang Bosheng, was killed. In January 1939, the 18th squadron was redeployed to Kunming (Yunnan) to defend the city from raids. Claire Chennault effectively led it, although there is no information about his personal participation in aerial combat. On August 1, the squadron moved to Chongqing, and in December of the same year, it participated in battles in southern Guangxi province.
In early 1940, it was again transferred to Yunnan province to protect the Kunming-Mengzi railway, which was subjected to massive raids. At the end of May, the squadron returned to Chongqing. As “Hawk” 75s were already scarce, in late June, it received nine old “Hawk” III biplanes from the 22nd squadron. On October 4, 1940, during a massive Japanese raid on Chengdu, the 3rd Army Air Force Headquarters ordered pilots to “disperse.” Six “Hawk” 75s from the 18th squadron flew to Guanxian, but en route, they were overtaken by the ubiquitous “Zeros.” As a result, only one aircraft reached its destination. One “Hawk” was shot down, two made forced landings, and two more were burned on the ground by the Japanese during refueling. By December 1, the 18th squadron had effectively ceased to exist.
On December 16, 1940, the 11th Fighter Aviation Group was formed at Taipingsi Air Base in Chengdu, comprising the newly established 41st, 42nd, 43rd, and 44th squadrons. From repair factories, they received 20 I-15s, 15 I-16s, 4 I-153s, and 5 “Hawks” 75s. It is noteworthy that even during this critical period for the Chinese Air Force, young, inexperienced pilots, recent graduates of flight schools, were not immediately thrown into battle but were sent to Qionglai (Sichuan province) for retraining and exercises.
On May 21, 1942, during a Japanese raid on Qionglai, six I-15s were burned there. Until November, the pilots of the 11th Aviation Group did not participate in battles. Meanwhile, more experienced Chinese pilots continued to fight the Japanese as best they could. The 26th squadron, equipped with I-16s since spring 1941, defended Lanzhou from raids, which was the final point of the ferry route from the USSR.
On May 21, eight “Chaikas” from the 21st squadron, led by Zhen Sheng, engaged 27 Japanese bombers and shot down one of them. This was the only victory for Chinese fighters in the first half of 1941. In the summer, up to a dozen “Chizhes” (I-16) and “Chaikas” attempted to be used for air defense of Chengdu and interception of Japanese reconnaissance planes, but without success.
In July-August, the Japanese continued to launch massive strikes against Chinese cities. On July 28, only seven I-153s (four returned) were able to take off to intercept 108 Japanese aircraft, and in the aerial battle on August 11, the last “Chaikas” were destroyed. In early 1942, the 17th squadron, with 11 I-153s, along with American volunteers, participated in battles over Burma, but they were soon sent “out of harm’s way” to the rear, to Lashio airbase, where the “Chaikas” were used as liaison aircraft. In the summer, the squadron returned to Chengdu. By that time, the city was protected by seven I-16s from the 29th squadron.
Simultaneously, another seven I-16s, led by the commander of the 29th squadron, Wang Yinhua, flew to Lanzhou to defend the city and airbase. In 1943, the only Chinese squadron still flying Soviet fighters was the 41st squadron of the 11th Aviation Group. In June, when combat operations took place in Chu’anhu province, they flew together with the 42nd squadron. Several sources mention a lone I-16 that shot down a Japanese Ki-43 over the “Burma Road” in 1943. Most likely, the pilot in the I-16’s cockpit was the commander of the 41st squadron, Chen Zhaoji, who opened his squadron’s combat score on June 6, 1943.
The Chinese operated our bombers with slightly more success. Despite numerous non-combat losses due to poor crew training, Chinese units flying SB and DB-3 aircraft occasionally continued to strike at the Japanese. For instance, on March 9, 1942, six DB-3s bombed Yichang at the limit of their operational range, with the loss of one aircraft. By the end of the year, only three combat-ready DB-3s remained in China. Due to a lack of spare parts, even training flights ceased. In January 1943, the squadrons flying DB-3s were disbanded.
Supplies of SB aircraft with M-103 engines (which the Chinese designated as SB III) continued to China right up until the start of the Great Patriotic War. In late 1940, concurrently with the 11th Fighter Aviation Group, the 12th Bomber Group was formed with SBs. For some reason, it never reached the front before its disbandment in 1944. Meanwhile, squadrons from the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Aviation Groups participated in the battles for Changsha in the autumn of 1941. On January 8, 1942, in an aerial battle over Hunan province, superior Japanese forces severely battered our “Katyushas” (SBs). Two SBs were shot down, and three more made forced landings.
After this, on January 22 and 24, during bombings of the Anqing airfield, Chinese bombers were covered by American volunteers – the “Flying Tigers.” Nevertheless, another SB was shot down on January 22. In mid-1942, most of the surviving SBs were concentrated on the border with Burma to combat local “opium kings.” American and Chinese command aimed to prevent the spread of drug addiction among troops at all costs, as it threatened the army’s combat effectiveness. In June-July, the 12th squadron carried out nine combat sorties for reconnaissance and bombing of poppy plantations, flying in mixed groups of SBs, “Corsairs,” and “Douglases.”
Additionally, bombers supported ground troops defending positions on the China-India border. By early 1943, the only truly combat-ready aviation unit flying SBs was the 1st Aviation Group, where 19 aircraft still remained airworthy. In May, they conducted their last sorties on the Hubei front. According to a Chinese historian, “1941 was the most difficult year for the Chinese Air Force in the eight-year war. In order to resist Japanese forces, the Chinese actively sought new international assistance.”
Even more surprising is the fact that in early June 1941, when the command staff of the 3rd Fighter Aviation Group was sent to Rangoon to receive new “Tomahawk” fighters (export designation “Hawk” 81A-3), purchased in America, the Chinese pilots refused them! Taiwanese sources report that “after checking the combat qualities of these fighters, it was determined that they could not counter the ‘Zero’.” Consequently, the aircraft were given to a group of American volunteers.
American Intervention and the “Flying Tigers”
Although World War II had been ongoing for a year and a half, by spring 1941, the United States formally continued to observe “diplomatic niceties.” The Lend-Lease Act, signed by President Roosevelt in March 1941, did not allow the USA to provide direct military aid to China. However, as early as April 15, 1941, Roosevelt officially authorized US Army personnel to participate in the war in China on a voluntary basis. The Kuomintang government provided them with 100 P-40Cs, purchased in the USA for $2.3 million (actually 99, as one crate with parts fell into the sea during transport). Aircraft assembly was carried out at Donghua airbase in Rangoon.
Claire Chennault had long since ceased to be an officer in the American army. As an advisor to the AC in China, he formally represented the “Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company.” On behalf of this company, he began forming a volunteer fighter aviation group and invited over 200 pilots and technicians to join his unit. Individual contracts with the Americans were signed in early July. Officially, the volunteer unit, which became part of the Chinese Air Force, was created on August 1, 1941, with Chennault, naturally, as its commander. Three fighter squadrons came under his command.
Soon, the “Tigers” relocated to Rangoon airfield, covering the ground operations of British troops against the Japanese. Their main task became the defense of the Burma-Yunnan highway (the “Burma Road”), which remained the only ground route for delivering military supplies to China throughout the war. In mid-December 1941, when it became clear that the Japanese intended to intensify raids on Yunnan province, where the Chinese part of the Burma Road ended, Chennault redeployed the 1st and 2nd squadrons to Kunming, while the 3rd remained in Rangoon.
On December 20, during a Japanese raid on Kunming, the Americans shot down four aircraft. After this, all three volunteer fighter squadrons were alternately stationed in Kunming and Rangoon. In early March 1942, due to the Japanese offensive, the Americans left Burmese territory and concentrated in China. Their task, in addition to defending Kunming and covering the “Burma Road,” also included the air defense of ground troop operational areas. The volunteers fought in China until mid-1942.
The Chinese write that “the ‘Flying Tigers’ unit, thanks to the excellent flight characteristics of the P-40 (compare with the assessment of Chinese pilots) and a high level of flight training, achieved excellent results.” According to their calculations, from December 20, 1941, to the end of May 1942, the “Tigers” participated in over 100 aerial battles, shooting down and damaging 297 Japanese aircraft, while losing 51 fighters themselves. (An analysis of actual data on Japanese losses paints a less optimistic picture. In fact, the “Flying Tigers” shot down only 31 aircraft (17 fighters, including 14 Ki-43s and 3 Ki-27s, and 14 bombers). Their own losses in aerial combat totaled 6 aircraft (5 “Tomahawks” and “Kittyhawks”). All other written-off machines were destroyed in accidents or raids on airfields).
On July 4, 1942, the American government withdrew the “Flying Tigers” from the Chinese Air Force and included them in the list of regular US Army units. They were transformed into the 23rd Fighter Aviation Group (wing) of the 10th US Army Air Force. In China, they became known as the “US Air Force special purpose unit” or the “unit of Allied countries fighting in China.” Claire Chennault continued to command the group.
The Himalayan Air Bridge: “The Hump”
The entry of the USA into the war with Japan at the end of 1941 became a true gift of fate for the Chinese. They automatically entered the list of countries receiving military equipment, including combat aircraft, from the USA under Lend-Lease. The “Burma Road” became fully operational, and almost all surviving Chinese aviation was transferred to Yunnan province for its defense. American aviation equipment under Lend-Lease began arriving in China from mid-1941, although it is possible that the first batches before early 1942 went under the guise of “purchases.”
The 9th bomber squadron of the Chinese Air Force was re-equipped with Lockheed A-29 attack bombers in August 1941. In October, it again took part in battles, conducting raids on Yuncheng (Shanxi), Hankou, and other cities and regions. The 30th squadron began re-equipping with A-29s from August, and the 11th from October 1942. By that time, the entire 2nd air group was already flying Lockheeds. From May 1943, it bombed targets in Hubei province. In the same year, the 10th squadron also mastered the A-29. In total, 29 (according to other data, 28) Lockheed A-29 attack bombers were supplied to China between 1941 and 1943. They participated in battles until mid-1944. In spring, the crews of the 2nd air group bombed a railway bridge on the Yellow River. Then they were redeployed to Nanzheng (Shanxi province) to participate in combat operations on the Central Plain.
Chinese retraining on American aircraft took place mainly in India (Karachi and other cities), where they were sent in groups and entire units. From late 1941, Chinese pilots, mostly recent graduates of flight schools, began to be sent to the USA for further training and mastery of American aircraft. In February 1943, in preparation for the transition to new American aviation equipment, the Chinese relocated initial training groups from their flight schools to India. Only reconnaissance and photography courses remained in China. In March 1945, cadets who had completed initial training in India were sent to America for further study. By then, the total number of seconded personnel amounted to 1224 people, of whom 384 managed to return to China to participate in battles.
In total, between 1942 and 1945, 420 training aircraft were sent from the USA to China via India, including 20 AT-6s, 8 AT-7s, 15 AT-17s, 150 PT-17s, 127 PT-19s, 70 PT-22s, and 30 BT-13s, as well as 10 Beechcraft D.17 ambulance aircraft. Aviation equipment was ferried to China across the Himalayas via an “air bridge” named “The Hump” (due to the similarity of the route’s terrain to the silhouette of a “ship of the desert”).
In early May 1942, Japanese troops occupied three key settlements in Burma, thereby cutting the “Burma Road.” To ensure an uninterrupted supply of strategic goods to China, at the request of the Kuomintang government, US authorities agreed to organize an “air bridge.” It was established by transport aviation units of the US Army and an air transport unit of a Chinese airline. Between 1942 and 1945, the Chinese received exactly 100 transport aircraft from the USA – 77 C-47 “Dakotas” and 23 C-46 “Commandos.”
Unprecedented air transport operations began between India, Burma, and China. In the west, “The Hump” started in India and reached the highlands of Yunnan and several mountain ranges in Sichuan province. After the air route opened, it became a true “road of life” for the Chinese. The amount of cargo transferred reached up to 70,000 tons monthly. According to Chinese calculations, from May 1942 to September 1945, a total of 650,000 tons were transported, of which Chinese pilots delivered 75,000 (12%). In addition, over 33,400 people were transported both ways across the “air bridge,” with a total flight time of 1.5 million hours.
Despite poor weather conditions and insufficient navigation support (there weren’t even enough navigators for all groups), American and Chinese pilots transported cargo daily to Chengdu, Kunming, and other cities. The “air bridge” operated until victory. Flights were accompanied by heavy losses due to bad weather, aircraft technical failures, and attacks by Japanese fighters. In total, 468 American and 46 Chinese crews, over one and a half thousand pilots, died on the “air bridge.” Monthly losses reached 50% of the aircraft simultaneously flying the route. “The Hump” proved to be the largest and longest strategic “air bridge” in the world. Only in 1948-1949 was it surpassed in transport volume by the Berlin Airlift.
Likely, after the Chinese pilots refused the P-40Cs, aircraft began to be sent to China from the USA on the principle of “take what we don’t want.” Between 1942 and 1943, the Chinese received 129 largely unsuccessful P-66 “Vanguard” fighters and 108 P-43A “Lancer” aircraft, which were practically unused on other fronts of World War II.
The 4th Aviation Group (21st-24th squadrons) was the first to receive American P-43A fighters in March 1942. It retrained in Kunming, and pilots alternately flew in small groups to India for new aircraft. On April 24, the deputy commander of the 24th squadron, Wu Zhenhua, crashed during takeoff in Kunming. On May 12, Chen Luokun, a flight commander from the 23rd squadron, died in a training flight, crashing into a tree upon landing. In July, for unknown reasons, a P-43 belonging to the commander of the 4th Aviation Group, Zheng Shaoyu, caught fire in the air, and the pilot died. On August 3, 1942, the group’s deputy commander, Chen Sheng, crashed during a training flight. A similar string of disasters accompanied Chinese pilots’ mastery of almost every new aircraft. (It is noteworthy that in Chinese sources, only deceased commanders of various ranks are named, while losses among ordinary pilots are generally not mentioned at all).
Having completed retraining on the P-43A in early August 1942, the group returned to Chengdu. From October 27, all squadrons flying “Lancers” began to escort A-29 bombers from the 2nd Aviation Group. On the same day, in an aerial battle with a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, a fighter from the 21st squadron was set on fire, and pilot He Dexiang died. The main base of the aviation group became Taipingsi in Chengdu, but on February 12, 1943, it returned to Baishiyi airfield (Chongqing) for Beidu’s air defense. In May 1943, it was sent to Liangshan (Sichuan) to support ground troops in Hubei province.
In early 1943, the 4th Aviation Group began re-equipping with new aircraft, receiving 41 P-43A fighters and 27 P-40Es. On January 10, 1943, the P-40E’s combat career in China began with a raid on Jingmen in Hubei province. Like most other machines flown by Chinese pilots, its success was not particularly noteworthy. One day, when four P-43As from the 21st squadron were covering “Kittyhawks” attacking Japanese troops, an aerial battle occurred. Four Chinese aircraft were immediately shot down, and another “Lancer” went missing. On February 24, 1943, 18 Japanese aircraft raided Qianjin, where the 22nd squadron had relocated in late 1942. Four “Lancers,” led by squadron commander Wang Tejian, took off to intercept. It would have been better if they hadn’t! Three out of the four fighters were soon shot down, and their pilots died. The fourth made a forced landing. The Japanese, as usual, withdrew without losses.
On May 19, during a raid on Yangsizhen (Hubei province), Xu Baoyun, the deputy commander of the 4th Aviation Group, was killed. That day, he was leading a group of eight P-40Es and four P-43As, covering A-29 bombers. An anti-aircraft shell pierced the fuel tank in his aircraft’s right wing. The machine was instantly engulfed in flames, and the pilot could not even escape the cockpit. A week later, on May 25, 15 “Kittyhawks” from the 23rd squadron flew to provide air cover for ground troops on the Hubei provincial border. Over the front line, deputy squadron commander Du Zhaohua broke from formation and independently began to assault Japanese positions. But this heroism did not last long. Suddenly, his aircraft exploded in the air, apparently from a direct hit by an anti-aircraft shell.
Two days later, four P-40Es from the 22nd squadron attacked Japanese positions in the Shangyu area. Two “Kittyhawks” were shot down by anti-aircraft gunners. Almost every combat sortie for the Chinese was accompanied by losses, but June 6 was a particularly grim day when the Japanese raided Liangshan airfield. In an aerial battle, 15 “Kittyhawks” that took off for interception were lost, and another aircraft burned on the ground. The commander of the 23rd squadron, future ace Zhou Zhikai, partially avenged the deaths of his comrades by shooting down two Japanese fighters, for which he was awarded a medal. In the June battles over Xi’an (west of Shanxi province), the 43rd squadron, armed with P-40Es, participated for the first time. They suffered their first loss on July 23 during a Japanese raid on their base when a Chinese pilot, taking off on alert, crashed into a dike.
The 3rd Aviation Group began sending pilots to India for P-66 fighters from mid-June 1942. In six months, it flew 60 aircraft, but only 15 remained with the group, the rest being transferred to the 5th and 11th Aviation Groups. The 7th squadron received “Vanguards” in September 1942 and began combat duty in Chongqing that same month. A month later, the 8th squadron joined it to strengthen the city’s air defense. The combat successes of the P-66 (albeit rather relative) can only include the aerial battle on August 23, 1943, over Chongqing. Aircraft from the 11th and 4th Aviation Groups, including several P-66s, took off to intercept Japanese bombers. The Chinese shot down two aircraft, losing two pilots in the process.
In the autumn of 1943, battles erupted for the city of Changde (Hunan province). On November 21, during a Japanese raid, squadron commander Ren Zao took off with four P-66s to intercept. The outcome was quite typical: none of the Chinese pilots returned to the airfield. The commander managed a forced landing; the others perished. Overall, in 1942 and early 1943, the main burden of the air war in China fell on the American 23rd Fighter Aviation Group (the former “Flying Tigers”). From July 1942 to March 1943, they shot down (according to Chinese data, likely highly exaggerated) 149 Japanese aircraft and dropped over 300 tons of bombs on enemy positions, while losing 16 P-40s themselves.
On March 10, 1943, the 23rd IAG was transformed into the 14th Army Air Force Wing of the US Army. Following this, it began receiving B-24 and B-25 bombers, and P-38, P-47, and P-51 fighters. Soon they had 60 B-25s and over 100 fighters. Their tasks included supporting ground troops on all fronts. Together with US Navy aviation, they carried out raids on Japanese airbases in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Philippines. 1943 became a turning point in the anti-Japanese war in China, as it did on other fronts of World War II.
From May 19 to June 6, 1943, active combat operations unfolded in the western regions of Hubei province. In aerial clashes, the number of both Chinese and Japanese aircraft often reached 40 on each side. The 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 11th Chinese aviation groups and the 14th US Army Air Wing (a total of 165 aircraft) fought shoulder to shoulder. In the battles for Hubei, Chinese aircraft groups flew 53 combat missions (fighters made 336 sorties, bombers 88). In total, according to Chinese data, they shot down 31 aircraft, destroyed 6 on the ground, and also sank and damaged 23 Japanese ships. But a much more important outcome of the battle in Hubei province was that for the first time in many years, the Chinese attempted to seize the initiative in the air war.
According to one Chinese historian: “…our Air Force began to transition from strategic defense to counter-offensive (…) They showed high activity in raids. They identified the directions of the main Japanese Air Force strikes and actively countered them. They carried out large-scale bombings of enemy airfields and positions of enemy troops. They conducted long-range raids and cut the enemy’s rear transport communications.” By mid-1943, the Chinese Air Force had a sufficient number of American combat aircraft and pilots trained to fly them.
At the same time, Claire Chennault, who had observed the low effectiveness and, in fact, complete helplessness of the Kuomintang air units for a number of war years, concluded that it would be expedient to unite all aviation units fighting in China. Chiang Kai-shek’s government positively received this idea, and on November 5, 1943, in Guilin, a mixed American-Chinese 16th Aviation Command was created “for better organization of interaction between Chinese and American air forces.” Initially, it included the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Chinese aviation groups, as well as part of the flight personnel of the US 14th Air Wing. The commander of this “aviation interbrigade” was still Chennault, who had managed to receive the rank of general of the US Air Force. All command was joint, on a parity basis. At each management level, there were two commanders, one from each side. Flight and ground personnel consisted of 2/3 Chinese. The aviation command was under the operational subordination of the Chinese Air Force command.
In mid-1943, the Chinese government sent the 1st, 3rd, and 5th aviation groups to a training center in India to master American aviation technology and air warfare tactics. Around the same time, a new modification of the “Kittyhawk” with a more powerful engine, designated P-40N, began arriving in China. It would later become the most numerous Chinese aircraft of World War II. The 14th Air Wing was the first to re-equip with the new “Hawks,” followed by the “purely Chinese” units.
In August 1943, the 28th and 32nd squadrons from the 3rd Aviation Group were sent to India for P-40Ns. And immediately, the “traditional” non-combat losses began. On September 14 and 30, during training flights, Zeng Peifu, commander of the 28th squadron, and Dai Dejin, commander of one of the flights, were killed. During a ferry flight, a C-47 crashed into a mountain, burying five pilots from the 28th squadron under its wreckage. But, despite the difficulties and sacrifices, on October 15, both squadrons with the new aircraft returned to China, tasked with strengthening the air defense of Guilin (Guangxi).
By the end of the year, pilots of the 7th and 8th squadrons completed their retraining. They became part of the American-Chinese aviation command, but still fought “the Chinese way.” For example, on December 23, five P-40Ns took off from Guilin to attack Tianhe airfield. Somewhere near the target, an aerial battle occurred, and these “Kittyhawks” were never seen again. In October 1943, the “Aviation Department” was first transformed into a department and then into a sector. Fighter and bomber squadrons were formed from pilots who had completed flight school courses. But this process proceeded extremely slowly, mainly due to the chronic shortage of gasoline, which was primarily allocated to Japanese combat aviation units.