Initial Deployment to Vietnam
In early 1975, as a senior lieutenant, I served in the Mukachevo Fighter Aviation Regiment. This regiment, then armed with MiG-21SMT aircraft, was one of the leading units in the Soviet Air Force. Its штатная structure provided for a second set of personnel—pilots and technical specialists—trained, as they said back then, “to perform international duty outside the USSR.”
I was included in this second set as a MiG-21 aviation equipment specialist and eagerly awaited my first special assignment to a foreign country. By chance, that country turned out to be the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Arriving in North Vietnam in February, I was included in a group of Soviet MiG-21 specialists.
At that time, the most advanced North Vietnamese machines of this type were the MiG-21 PFM. Two regiments were equipped with these “twenty-ones,” based at airfields: Noi Bai near Hanoi and Kep, 80 km from the capital. Our group consisted of 18-22 people, with the number changing, increasing when the Vietnamese requested additional pilots, or decreasing when someone, having worked the contract term, flew back to the Union.
Besides pilots, the group included four engineers (for airframe and engine (SD), armaments, aviation equipment (AO), radio and radio-electronic equipment), four heads of routine maintenance groups, and four or five specialists from the “Znamya Truda” factory, who carried out MiG modifications in accordance with incoming bulletins. The group was led by Lt. Col. Tsvetkov (deputy regiment commander for flight training from Tiraspol). Overall leadership of Soviet aviation specialists in Vietnam was carried out by Gen. Maj. Obmelyukhin, advisor to the DRV Air Force Commander-in-Chief.
We ensured MiG-21 flights from both airfields. We lived directly on the airbases in light structures resembling bungalows. The Vietnamese restricted our movements outside the base—only organized and with escort. The “hospitable hosts” paid close attention to the group: practically everyone we interacted with (translators, service personnel, technical staff, etc.) wrote reports on our activities.
Soviet Assistance and Operational Challenges
Besides us, there were other groups of Soviet specialists in Vietnam, but we only saw them in Hanoi when we came to the embassy for monthly reports. To be fair, we also reported on more than just work.
The Vietnamese Air Force was also armed with MiG-19 (J-6) fighters, manufactured in the PRC, and MiG-17s of Soviet and Chinese production. However, Chinese specialists worked in units equipped with these machines. Although our treatment was quite normal, it was immediately clear that the DRV at that time was more oriented towards its northern neighbor.
The PRC Military Academy was rated higher than the Soviet one. Priority was given to pilots and engineers with Chinese education. Our group’s task was to train in the correct operation and repair of the MiG-21. However, we did not have the right to demand any work and only gave recommendations; whether to take them into account or not was decided by the Vietnamese.
In the Union, I could prohibit the flight of an aircraft on which scheduled maintenance had not been performed. Here, I did not have such an opportunity. Preparing aviation equipment for flight was not part of our duties, but the Vietnamese organized training in such a way that it occurred directly during the preparation process. They sought to have as many machines as possible pass through the hands of Soviet specialists, rightly believing that if we prepared an aircraft, we did it well.
Our pilots also had additional duties—test flights of aircraft after repairs and routine maintenance. Most Vietnamese officers serving on the MiG-21 had graduated from the Krasnodar Flight Technical School and knew Russian quite well. Junior technical staff knew Russian poorly, and we worked with them through translators. This created additional difficulties, as the Vietnamese often distorted the meaning of information in a way that benefited them during translation.
In Vietnam, I saw outstanding pilots; however, the overall level of the airmen was not above average. They received good training, but they flew steadily, “as expected,” showing no desire to display skill. Among the engineering staff, there were also good specialists, some of whom had completed two universities: a Soviet one and a Chinese one. But they also did not show much desire to serve.
The Vietnamese performed the required amount of work, but they were unwilling to do anything not provided for by the regulations, even based on their own experience. They never missed an opportunity to “sit it out and lie down.” Service in the DRV army was compulsory: male population, starting from 15 years old, was “under arms.” It seemed that almost all military personnel were members of the communist party; however, for the most part, they treated revolutionary ideas without enthusiasm and were communists only “because they had to be.” A party meeting in the regiment could last a whole week. During this time, we were not taken to the airfield, concealing that a party meeting was taking place there.
Recovery and Study of American Trophy Aircraft
The DRV government, skillfully using the fact that the Soviet Union was ready to provide “the struggling outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia” with weaponry in virtually unlimited quantities, sought to accumulate as many aircraft, tanks, and other military equipment as possible. When the number of aircraft exceeded the number of crews, previously received machines began to be transferred to storage bases. When in 1972 the Americans carried out massive bombings of DRV territory, the Vietnamese managed to disperse and preserve much combat equipment.
One such storage base was located 4 km from Noi Bai airfield and was connected to it by an asphalt road, along which aircraft could, if necessary, taxi directly to the start. At this open-air parking lot were two dozen MiG-21 PF and earlier modification machines. In one of the nearest hills, a huge cave-shelter had been dug, allowing up to 20 fighters to be serviced simultaneously using a flow method (moving the aircraft from one block point to another).
In preparing the North Vietnamese Air Force for large-scale combat operations in the South, it was decided to check the combat readiness of the stored aircraft. The assessment of the machines’ condition at the base near Noi Bai was carried out by a mixed Vietnamese-Soviet commission, which included from our side: the advisor to the chief engineer of the Air Force, specialists in airframe/engine, armaments, radio-electronic equipment, and myself—an avionics engineer. Our inspection showed that the aircraft had no combat damage, but, having stood for one and a half to two years in a humid and hot climate in an unpreserved state (only canopies were covered and plugs installed), they had become completely unusable.
Even the skin had lost its smoothness and become rough. The commission concluded that further operation of these MiGs was impossible, pointing out the impracticality of sending them to repair factories in the USSR. In warehouses, the Vietnamese had collected a huge amount of spare parts and equipment, including some that were no longer installed on the machines in operation at that time. Their accounting was well organized, but the storage conditions were terrible.
In early March 1975, communist armed formations in South Vietnam began a general offensive, which the DRV Air Force was also involved in supporting. The situation at our base remained calm. The participation of aircraft in combat operations in the South was carefully concealed. It was officially believed that a civil war was taking place there, in which the regular North Vietnamese army was not participating.
Of course, it was impossible to hide the combat nature of the sorties from us: real weapons were hung on the aircraft, and the MiGs returned without them. The pilots returned excited, not hiding their joy at the victories achieved, but they avoided talking about the completed mission. Over two months of combat, only two victories, achieved in North Vietnamese skies, were credited to MiG-21 pilots. Aircraft shot down by them over South Vietnam were not officially accounted for.
Soon we began to be involved in repairing MiGs directly at field airfields. Depending on the nature of the malfunctions, a group of 4-5 specialists was formed and flew by helicopter to border areas. We could only be there unofficially. We landed on a well-compacted dirt airfield, where one or two damaged MiG-21s stood. No one reported where we had arrived, local Vietnamese did not engage in conversations, and no flights were made in our presence.
At these points, our specialists sometimes came under shelling and raids from South Vietnamese aviation. In early May, it became obvious that hostilities had ended: the intensity of flights decreased, and they began to be conducted with training weapons. Soon, at Noi Bai airbase, while observing the general rehearsal of a victory air parade, I witnessed the collision of two MiG-19s passing over the runway. Amazingly, this tragic incident caused no commotion: the runway was cleared, and flights continued.
Two months after the end of the war, the flight personnel of our regiment were significantly updated—young people replaced many experienced pilots who departed for the South. There, new air regiments were being formed with captured equipment. Half a year later, I was also able to familiarize myself in detail with some American machines.
On the evening of November 12, Lt. Col. Mitin, advisor to the chief engineer of the DRV Air Force, arrived. Without setting a specific task, he selected two people: the head of the airframe/engine group and me, having first confirmed my knowledge of radio equipment. The three of us went to Hanoi and a day later, together with the military attaché, flew on a “Douglas” to Da Nang, where the largest airbase in Vietnam is located.
It has two excellent runways, oriented towards the sea. Along each runway is a taxiway about 30 m wide. In the center of the base is a powerful control point. There are two command and control towers, one of which is protected. The surface is mainly asphalt, only in the engine run-up areas are there concrete slabs. The base housed more than 150 American-made aircraft and helicopters. The equipment was in excellent condition, serviced by captive South Vietnamese specialists.
In Da Nang, we were tasked with controlling the technical condition of captured aviation equipment being transferred to the USSR, then preparing it for sea transport and loading it onto a dry cargo ship. Which specific types of aircraft and in what configuration would be transferred was decided by the military attaché and General Staff officers who arrived at the airbase. Initially, we had to select one of the F-5 fighters. The Vietnamese demonstrated three machines in the air: a pair of MiG-21s took off, and then F-5s, piloted by captive pilots, successively took off, made a circle, and landed. After ensuring that the aircraft were in flying condition, we proceeded to their detailed inspection. The working conditions were excellent. The equipment was successively driven into a well-equipped hangar, where we thoroughly examined it for several days.
The first F-5 was rejected: the oil cooler was leaking, and the communications radio was not working. We chose the next one, which proved to be in absolutely serviceable condition. We sealed this aircraft to prevent equipment replacement. The F-5 made a very good impression, favorably differing from the MiG-21. The mass-dimensional characteristics of the equipment were significantly better. For example, the generator was 2-3 times smaller than ours. Very miniature and convenient disposable batteries were used. The maintainability was ideal: the aircraft was so simple to operate that we practically did not use technical documentation. For refueling the hydraulic system, a special self-propelled trolley with a diesel engine was used. Engine start was pneumatic, using a trolley equipped with a PGD (Portable Ground Device).
The composition of the pilot’s cockpit equipment was similar to that of the MiG-21, but the instruments were more miniature, many of them with tape indicators. The circuit breaker toggles were rubberized, which was unusual for us then. The cockpit painting was a soft turquoise color (MiG-23 cockpits were later painted in a similar, but sharper, color). Along with the fighter, we received a significant amount of spare parts and an almost complete set of technical documentation. No F-5 flight operation manuals passed through our hands. The documentation was compiled accessibly, and a competent specialist could easily master the operation of this machine. In addition, the Vietnamese handed over a lot of ground equipment: a complete set necessary for servicing one aircraft, a complete set (including control and test equipment) for four aircraft, and some from a set for 10 aircraft.
We also carefully selected one example of the light attack aircraft A-37 and the necessary spare parts and technical documentation for it. The aircraft was even simpler than the F-5. I was particularly impressed by the side-by-side seating of the pilots. The cockpit was compact, but comfortable, and in terms of its equipment, it resembled a helicopter cockpit. Working with this machine was as pleasant as with the previous one. For the F-5 and A-37, the Vietnamese also provided two additional engines, which were packed in special hermetic containers filled with inert gas. This storage method excluded harmful climatic influence and did not require de-preservation before installing the engine on the aircraft. After opening the containers, we inspected the engines and checked for documentation, then placed them back in the containers and pumped inert gas into them.
They also provided us with an “anti-guerrilla” AC-119—a medium military transport aircraft with a powerful complex of small arms installed in the cargo compartment for operations against ground targets. Sea transport of aircraft of such dimensions involves certain difficulties. For reasons unclear to us, they did not want to ferry it by air, although the machine was in flying condition. Having received the appropriate task, we thoroughly familiarized ourselves with the AC-119 and reported that the aircraft itself was clearly outdated and of no interest, only its special equipment deserved attention. A command then followed not to transport the machine to the Union, but to dismantle and send the weapon system.
From the helicopters available at the airbase, we selected two: a CH-47 “Chinook” in the assault variant and a UH-1 “Iroquois” in the combat variant. Compared to our combat Mi-8, the American “Iroquois” looked clearly preferable. The machine was much smaller, but much better equipped for combat: two six-barrel machine guns installed in the cargo compartment openings, a grenade launcher, and guided missiles on the pylons. The pilots’ cockpit was armored from below and the sides.
Over ten days, we thoroughly checked everything and prepared it for shipment. No preservation of the machines was carried out, because the equipment would arrive in Vladivostok in just a week, and then, probably, near Moscow (on the boxes with spare parts and literature we wrote the address: Moscow-400, Ivanov). The F-5 and A-37 were towed by road to Da Nang port, while the “Chinook” and “Iroquois” flew there. They were piloted under escort by captive South Vietnamese pilots. At the port, we detached and stowed the helicopter blades in their cradles. Then we proceeded to load the equipment onto the dry cargo ship with its onboard crane. For this, the helicopters had powerful rigging lugs, and the aircraft were equipped with eyebolts screwed into special sockets. However, the four small eyebolts of the F-5 did not inspire our confidence. This machine was lifted aboard by running wide rubberized straps, provided by the sailors, under the fuselage. Then all accompanying aggregates and equipment, two large boxes with aircraft documentation, and one with helicopter documentation were loaded.
After completing the work in the port, we returned to the airbase and soon flew to Noi Bai. Already in the Union, from my former classmates working in TsNII-30, I learned that the trophies we selected were thoroughly researched at the Air Force Research Institute. In February 1976, I departed for home. My first special assignment had ended.