Introduction to a Forgotten Battle
The famous “Battle on the Ice” against the German “knight-dogs” on Lake Peipus occurred almost seven hundred years before the events we describe. Despite such a significant period, the “Battle on the Ice,” in terms of its fame, bears no comparison to the events we intend to recount.
However, we hope that this brief outline of the air-naval (or, more precisely, lake) operation, conducted in the same area by sailors of the 25th River Ship Brigade and pilots of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force against the new “crusaders,” will be of interest to readers.
The Struggle for Lake Control
The defeat of German-fascist troops near Leningrad in January 1944 and the subsequent advance of Red Army units to the southwest brought them directly to Estonia’s borders. The republic’s eastern territory was covered by the vast waters of Lake Peipus and Lake Pskov, leaving narrow land “gates” through the swampy Narva Isthmus.
In winter, the lakes froze, covering themselves with sufficiently strong ice. As in ancient times, in 1944, the choice of location for forcing the water barrier was unequivocally determined: the narrow strait between the two lakes, the so-called Teploe Lake (Lake Lämmijärv).
On February 12, 1944, units of the 90th Rifle Division, under Colonel N.G. Lyashenko of the 42nd Army, crossed the strait on the ice and occupied Piirissaar Island, located near the Estonian coast. On February 14, the 128th Rifle Division replaced the 90th Division on the island. This opened a real opportunity for Soviet troops to enter Estonia or, at the very least, to establish an operational bridgehead.
The enemy, although having taken measures to strengthen the defense of the Estonian lake coast, was unprepared for the rapid advance of Soviet troops. Units of the 2nd Regiment of the 11th East Prussian Infantry Division unexpectedly encountered our units and were forced to engage in battle while on the march, suffering significant losses. Unfortunately, as has happened repeatedly, Soviet troops failed to consolidate their initial success. By February 24, the Germans had not only eliminated the bridgehead on the western shore but also restored control over Piirissaar Island.
The first attempt to break into Estonia via Lake Peipus ended in failure. The Luftwaffe played a significant role in this. On February 14, 1944, attack aircraft of the 1st Air Fleet carried out 104 sorties to strike Soviet troops in the Teploe Lake area and Piirissaar Island. Bad weather prevented further concentration, but with its improvement, German aviation reappeared: on February 23, sixty-eight sorties, and on the 24th, twenty-one sorties by attack aircraft.
Despite the first Red Army assault being repulsed, the Wehrmacht High Command had decided in 1943 to prepare a rear defensive position in the northwest, supported by the Chudskaya (Peipus) military flotilla on the lakes. The decision to create it was made in late 1943, and on November 1, the “War at Sea Leadership Diary” reported that 24 of the sixty Krupp-built “MAL” type gunboats were intended for this flotilla. The “marine artillery lighters” (MAL) formed the core of the 4th Gunboat Flotilla, powerful 146-ton vessels armed with 88mm and 37mm cannons, capable of overland transport.
The Soviet command began creating its lake flotilla somewhat later, facing logistical challenges in transferring the 25th River Ship Brigade. It was only on May 19 that the first boats were unloaded on the shore of Lake Peipus. From May 24, “Yaks” of the Baltic Fleet Air Force began systematic aerial reconnaissance.
Meanwhile, the Germans had no intention of remaining passive. On May 28, four “Focke-Wulfs” attacked Soviet patrol boats, damaging BKA No. 214. A new attack on June 6 again resulted in damage to BKA No. 322. In response, the 14th Air Army of the 3rd Baltic Front redeployed six Yak-1 fighters for air cover, and the 42nd Army reinforced air defense with 45mm and 37mm anti-aircraft batteries.
By mid-June, a real naval war gradually unfolded on Lake Peipus. On June 13, BKA No. 213 rammed and sank enemy boat KM-8. However, neither side undertook decisive actions initially.
Soviet Air Offensive and the Final Landing
The situation changed sharply in mid-July with the Soviet advance in Belarus, threatening German communications. The Soviet command found it tempting to strike the enemy’s flank by landing troops on Teploe Lake. To completely eliminate the threat from enemy ships, the Baltic Fleet command allocated an entire assault aviation division (9th SHAD), a powerful force of 154 attack aircraft and fighters, decisively shifting the situation in favor of the Soviets.
On July 19, the 9th SHAD struck the Mustvee base three times, damaging three fast landing barges and destroying one patrol boat. The next day, Mustvee was subjected to three more raids; according to the German “War at Sea Leadership Diary,” three gunboats were considered irrevocably lost. The division continued to attack German bases, and on July 27, gunboat MAL13 sank and MAL14 was heavily damaged, disabling half of the enemy flotilla’s strike forces.
Despite German requests for fighter cover, effective Luftwaffe aid was limited. By early August, MAL16 was damaged and sank, and four patrol boats were destroyed. Surprisingly, the Soviet command considered the threat from the German 4th Flotilla not eliminated, and the 9th SHAD resumed massive strikes. However, raid intensity sharply dropped due to severe aviation fuel shortages.
On August 12, a landing group was created for a night operation on Teploe Lake, which commenced on August 16 as planned. The first echelon successfully landed, but the Luftwaffe retaliated. German aircraft struck the 25th Brigade’s landing craft, damaging several and sinking the minelayer MK-5. The 546th Rifle Regiment suffered serious losses. By August 17, the 25th Brigade had irrevocably lost one armored boat, three tenders, two minelayers, and two minesweeper boats, with seven of 14 ferries sinking. Soviet command urgently ordered reinforcements.
Nevertheless, Soviet troops consolidated their bridgehead and met with the 86th Rifle Division. The landing operation was completed by August 18, having transported about 7,000 combatants and significant materiel. German aviation sharply reduced the intensity of its raids.
Soviet military history considers the operation a success, accelerating the 67th Army’s advance. However, it omits that Luftwaffe raids caused heavy losses to crossing means, drastically slowing the landing. Soviet air cover, despite having four fighter regiments, failed to effectively protect the landing craft, leading to adverse consequences.
Interestingly, German historians studying 1944 Baltic operations do not mention this significant Luftwaffe “success,” attributing the failure to stop the landing to the crumbling German defense in the Baltics and a lack of effective air support. On September 20, 1944, the “Battle of Peipus” concluded with the destruction by their own crews of the remaining ships of the 4th Gunboat Flotilla.
Overall, from July 19 to August 30, 9th SHAD attack aircraft made 795 sorties, and the division’s fighters made 927. According to crew reports, 42 enemy ships and vessels were destroyed, and 67 were damaged. Soviet losses amounted to three aircraft from anti-aircraft fire and five shot down in air combat.
Key German Naval Losses (4th Flotilla)
- MAL13 – destroyed by airstrike on 27.07.1944
- MAL14 – heavily damaged by airstrike on 27.07.1944
- MAL15 – destroyed by airstrike on 18.07.1944
- MAL16 – damaged and sank by airstrike on 02.08.1944
- MAL17 – destroyed by airstrike on 20.07.1944
- MAL18 – destroyed by airstrike on 30.08.1944
- MAL19 – destroyed by airstrike on 19.07.1944
- MAL20 – destroyed by airstrike on 20.08.1944
- MAL22 – heavily damaged by airstrike on 08.08.1944
- MAL23 – destroyed by airstrike on 09.08.1944
- MAL24 – destroyed by airstrike on 28.08.1944