Black Week of the Bomber Command

First, a brief prehistory of Black Week. On June 15, 1950, Kim Il Sung’s army began a liberation march southward, to free the South Korean brothers from the puppet pro-American regime of Syngman Rhee and restore Korea’s integrity. Seoul fell on June 28. The UN declared the DPRK an aggressor and sent military aid to the South Koreans.

On July 5, the first American ground units from the 8th Army entered combat. However, the surprise of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) attack prevented the quick organization of effective resistance. On August 4, the KPA reached the Naktong River line on the southeastern tip of the Korean Peninsula – UN troops found themselves in the “Pusan Pocket”.

For over a month, UN Commander-in-Chief General MacArthur accumulated forces in the “pocket” for a counteroffensive. Finally, on September 15, he landed marines at Incheon, flanking the North Koreans, and a week later moved his army north from Pusan. By October, the KPA was completely pushed back beyond the pre-war demarcation line – the 38th Parallel.

This seemed insufficient to the warlike MacArthur, and he undertook his own liberation march – northward, to overthrow Kim Il Sung’s puppet pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing regime. On October 26, advanced UN units reached the Chinese border – the Yalu River, and the next day Chinese People’s Volunteers entered the war. On November 1, MiG-15s with Soviet pilots appeared in the sky.

An avalanche of Chinese People’s Volunteers swept UN troops from the Yalu and rolled south. By mid-December, the volunteers reached the 38th Parallel. On January 4, 1951, they again occupied Seoul. However, by this time they were exhausted, and the regrouped UN forces made a renewed effort. And now, the actual story.

The Air Conflict in Korea

In the spring of 1951, the front line stabilized on the Han River north of Seoul. From this time until the end of the war, the sides launched countless large and small offensives and counteroffensives, new thousands of lives burned in the fire of war, yet the 38th Parallel remained the dividing line of the Korean Peninsula.

The main force thanks to which UN troops managed to hold back the numerically superior Korean-Chinese armies was the US Far East Air Forces (FEAF). Small groups of their attack aircraft, who knew the rear areas of the KPA and CPV troops like the back of their hand, instantly detected any changes on the ground and struck, leaving the enemy no chance to hide.

On the roads of North Korea, air terror did not cease for an hour, only slightly diminishing at night. Daytime transit on main roads was impossible even for a single truck, let alone a convoy. Korean-Chinese troops, effectively cut off from their rear units, experienced an acute need at the front for the most essential supplies – fresh reinforcements, weapons, ammunition, provisions, and medicines.

The Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (FAC) was simply unable to cover all of North Korea’s communications from the air, which was explained by the following objective reasons: the complexity of the air situation stemming from the significant numerical superiority of enemy aircraft; the necessity of covering very important objectives on a wide front with only their own forces, with an almost complete lack of support from Chinese and Korean aviation; an insufficiently high combat composition of the corps, averaging: until October 1951 – 160 combat-ready MiG-15 crews and 20 La-11 crews, and from early October – 100 combat-ready MiG-15 crews and 20 La-11 crews; and the extreme limitation of the airfield network in the area of operation, completely precluding the possibility of forward and front-line airfield maneuvers.

The last fact – the absence of airfields in North Korean territory – also greatly frustrated the command of the Chinese-Korean United Air Army (UAA). In addition to MiG-15s, the UAA was armed with Yak-9, La-9/11 fighters, Il-10 attack aircraft, and Tu-2 bombers. All of them, in theory, could operate on the battlefield and on communications in the rear of UN troops.

However, they required cover, and MiGs, flying from bases in Manchuria, were unable to reach the front line. Thus, advanced airfields in North Korea could have helped achieve air superiority over its entire territory and, ultimately, contributed to a fundamental turning point in the war.

One of the first airfields the Koreans tried to build was Uiju on the southern bank of the Yalu River, in close proximity to the Andong air hub. The attempts, however, were unsuccessful. As James Johnson wrote, “…In late 1950, the Russians and Chinese received reinforcements in the form of the first North Korean MiG-15 unit, based at Uiju airfield near the Manchurian border.”

The Uiju venture was foolish from its inception, as the Americans, constantly employing offensive tactics and for the first time having the opportunity to attack an enemy “jet” base, struck the airfield day and night. …After roughly six weeks of pounding, North Korean aviation withdrew to Manchuria, from where it returned only after the armistice was signed.

By late September 1951, “MiG Alley” had become too dangerous a place for any UN strike aircraft unless they were provided with proper F-86 cover. However, “Sabres” were desperately scarce. For example, in June, the commander of the 4th Fighter Wing, Colonel Herman A. Schmid, had only 44 “Sabres” at his disposal, and even those were mostly on paper.

The enormous shortage of spare parts, difficulties in repairing damaged aircraft, and meager equipment replenishment led to, in Schmid’s words, “technical services having to perform miracles to get at least half of the ‘Sabres’ into the air.” Commanders of the US 5th Air Force bombarded Washington with demands to send a second F-86 wing to Korea, or at least to rearm one of the existing wings from “Shooting Stars” to “Sabres”.

General Frank F. Everest, who took command of the 5th Air Force on June 1, 1951, was no exception. And when his request for F-86s was again denied in September, he canceled attack aircraft sorties to the Yalu, redirecting them to areas from the Chongchon River to Pyongyang. The North Koreans then had the opportunity to resume airfield construction.

The Escalation of Daylight Raids

In early October, US reconnaissance aircraft began bringing back photographs showing 18 nearly completed airfields. The three most advanced, capable of accommodating jet aircraft, were Namsi, Taecheon, and Saam-chan. MiGs, based at any of these, could provide cover for Il-10s, which would then have the opportunity to strike UN troop rear targets.

Based at these airfields, MiGs could extend their “Alley” over almost all of North Korea’s territory. The complex of airfields immediately became target #1 for the FEAF. For fighter-bomber pilots, the task of destroying the airfields would have been too difficult.

To reliably put them out of action required a concentrated raid by large strike forces, for which there simply weren’t enough “Sabres” for cover. The only force truly capable of destroying the airfields turned out to be B-29s – a flight of “Superfortresses” was equal in strike power to an entire attack aircraft wing.

For safety, it was decided to bomb airfields with relatively small B-29 forces at night, using the SHORAN radio navigation system, which, when used properly, yielded very high results at any time of day in any weather conditions. However, “proper use” also implied experienced crews, which were lacking, so in the first two B-29 sorties of the 307th Group against Saamchan airfield, conducted on October 13 and 14, not a single bomb fell even near the target.

The airfield issue required an urgent solution. The FEAF headquarters, having no alternative, decided on large-scale daylight raids. To provide a “screen” and escort for the B-29s, the days of “fortress” sorties became “days of maximum tension” for jet fighter and fighter-bomber units.

The first such sortie took place on October 18. Bombers of the 98th Group, whose target was Taecheon, did not meet their escort fighters and bombed an alternative target. At the same time, the 19th Group struck Saamchan – the southernmost of the three airfields. On October 21, the 98th Group again targeted Taecheon, and again, missing their cover, attacked an alternative target.

The task of destroying Taecheon was transferred to the bombers of the 19th Group. Their sortie, which took place the next day, Monday, October 22, opened the most terrible week in the history of Bomber Command.

OCTOBER 22

This was a massive raid on several targets simultaneously. According to our archival documents, shortly after 15:00, 12 B-29s and more than fifty (in various documents from 64 to 106) fighters of different types appeared in five groups in the Anju area, within the Soviet divisions’ area of responsibility.

While “Sabres” patrolled the Taecheon-Pakchon-Anju area at 9000 meters altitude, F-80 and F-84 attack aircraft struck railway stations in the Sukchon-Anju-Sunchon area.

At 15:03, the fighters of the 303rd Fighter Aviation Division (FAD) began their ascent: 20 MiG-15s from the 17th Fighter Aviation Regiment (FAR), 14 MiG-15s from the 18th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, and 20 MiG-15s from the 523rd FAR. The pilots’ task was to repel the enemy’s attack and bomber aviation raid. At this time, the target of the “Superfortresses” remained unclear.

Soon, the groups of the 17th and 523rd regiments engaged the attack aircraft. The group of the 18th Guards FAR, having gained an altitude of 10000 meters, began to be vectored from the ground towards the B-29s.

A. P. Smorchkov recalls: “…Sorties against B-29s were the most difficult. One of them I remember most… We were scrambled in difficult weather conditions, and we were not “top-class” pilots. There was a break in the clouds – we went into it, and while we climbed to 10 thousand, everything was completely overcast. Then they gave the command to follow a certain course, they said, “the big ones” are there. We had to lose 5 thousand feet of altitude and get under the clouds.

But how to get through solid cloud cover? I can do it alone, but we are a whole regiment. And you can’t ask “ground control,” they’ll say: “Figure it out yourself!” – and then they’ll also punish you… I looked back – the whole regiment was behind me, holding formation well. “We’ll dive,” I transmitted, “everyone be careful, don’t ‘close up’ in the clouds!” I dove, afraid to move, watching my wingman – there he was, right next to me, but I couldn’t see anything beyond him. I was very anxious – just hoped no one would collide! As commander, I bore moral responsibility for all my pilots… And legal too. If even one pair collided – you would definitely be to blame!

Nevertheless, we broke through the clouds. Through the canopy, it got brighter and brighter, and finally, we were under the clouds, and in front of us, 3 kilometers away, were the “fortresses”. According to command post calculations, there were 12 bombers – I counted them myself – and up to 20 escort fighters. How was my regiment? I looked back – oh my! – all my lads were with me, and I immediately felt relieved. I told the guys: “We’re hitting the “big ones”, don’t forget about the “small stuff”!” – and we went on the attack. They were blasting at full afterburner, but their speed was 500, and ours was 1100. And the escort, it seemed, were cowards. You push with a MiG in a pair, a quartet – and they scatter in all directions, clearing the way to the “fortresses”. Good, I thought, the guys are working for us.

I fire one burst. I look – it’s a bit far, the tracer goes down. I quickly closed in, and the shells went straight. I hit the right “box” – that’s two engines – I “separated” the engines, and there, in the wing, a fuel tank – and the fortress went down… In such red flames… Then “paratroopers” poured out of it. I saw six parachutes; no time to look for the others – their escort had reacted.

I always taught my guys that for such a behemoth as the B-29, you shouldn’t spare any ammunition. If each of us gives it our entire supply, and each shoots one down – that would be great. That time, after the “fortress,” I still had shells left; I shot down another F-84. Then I told Volodia Voistinykh, my wingman: “Go ahead, I’ll cover you.” But, by that time, the fight had already died down. From the ground, they commanded: “Carpet!” – everyone land…”

According to documents, Lieutenant Colonel Smorchkov’s flight attacked the rear quartet of “Superfortresses.” A. P. Smorchkov opened fire from a distance of 900 meters and ceased the attack only at 300 meters. His wingman, Lieutenant Voistinykh, fired ineffectively at the rear bomber from a long range. The second pair of our flight – Guards Senior Lieutenants Stepanov and Shabanov – attacked the second pair of the B-29 flight. After their bursts, the bombers “…continued to maintain their place in formation, but the crews observed shell hits on the B-29’s fuselage and wings”.

On our side, 2 MiGs of the 18th Guards FAR received minor damage, presumably from the fire of F-84s escorting the “Superfortresses”.

After the battle, the commander of the 303rd FAD, Kumanichkin, reported in his order: “On 22.10.51, 14 crews of the 18th Guards FAR, operating in the formation’s cover group in the Teishu area, broke through the clouds and at an altitude of 5000 m encountered 12 B-29s under the direct cover of 12 F-84s and 8 Gloster “Meteor-4″. The group leader, Lieutenant Colonel Smorchkov, decided to engage the escort fighters and attack the bombers. In the battle, 5 F-84s and 1 B-29 were shot down, and 2 B-29s were damaged. Lieutenant Colonel Smorchkov personally shot down 1 B-29 and 1 F-84”. Later, information emerged that the B-29s damaged by Senior Lieutenants Stepanov and Shabanov fell into the sea, and they were credited as downed. Simultaneously, the number of victories by pilots of the 18th Guards FAR over F-84s decreased to three. American sources report that 9 B-29s of the 19th Group participated in the airfield strike under the direct cover of 24 “Thunderjets,” and admit the loss of only one bomber in that battle.

OCTOBER 23

If there was an element of chance in the MiGs and B-29s meeting on Monday, then on Tuesday, the “Superfortress” crews were in for a well-planned warm welcome. All veterans know about the battle of October 23, 1951; authors worldwide mention it. We pay special attention to this day because it truly became a landmark in the history of the war – “Black Tuesday”.

From the battle description: “Between 8:10-8:30 (9:10-9:30), our radar systems detected at altitudes of 6500-8000 m on the Kaishu-Kinsen-Isen-Iotoku line, 8 groups of enemy aircraft, consisting of 8 to 32 aircraft per group, totaling up to 200 fighters of F-86, F-84, F-80 types and Gloster “Meteor-4”, and two bomber groups of 10-12 B-29s each. These, between 8:35-9:04 (9:35-10:04), delivered a concentrated bomb and assault strike in the areas: attack aircraft – Anju, Hakusen, Teishu from altitudes of 4000 m down to ground level, and bombers – against Namsi airfield from an altitude of 7000 m (bombs fell 2 km south of the airfield; the airfield remained undamaged).

The actions of the attack and bomber aircraft were secured by a fighter “screen” of 40 F-86s, patrolling in the Kijyo-Sensen area at altitudes of 8000-10000 m, and direct patrolling by up to 80 fighters at altitudes of 6000-9000 m. In total, up to 200 fighters and 22 bombers participated in the raid. The enemy’s plan: To disrupt the supply of Korean-Chinese troops and disable the Taisen and Namsi airfields, deliver a concentrated bomb and assault strike on bridges, crossings, railway sections, and airfields under construction, using a large number of attack aircraft and bombers operating under strong fighter cover.

Commander’s decision: Assessing the situation, the commander of the 64th FAC decided to repel the concentrated raid by enemy bombers and attack aircraft with two divisions of the corps, by sequentially committing them to battle. In accordance with this decision, the 305th FAD, comprising the 17th, 18th, and 523rd FARs (58 MiG-15s), formed the first echelon and was tasked with striking the main group of enemy bombers and attack aircraft.

The 324th FAD, consisting of the 176th and 196th FARs (26 MiG-15s), formed the second echelon of the corps, tasked with building up forces in battle and ensuring the withdrawal of units from the 305th FAD. The 351st FAR constituted the corps commander’s reserve.

Between 8:12-8:16 (9:12-9:16), corps units achieved readiness #1. Between 8:24-8:33 (9:24-9:33), by command from the FAC Command Post, the 303rd FAD was scrambled, consisting of the 17th FAR (20 MiG-15s) under Major MASLENNIKOV, the 18th Guards FAR (20 MiG-15s) under Lieutenant Colonel SMORCHKOV, and the 523rd FAR (18 MiG-15s) under Major OSKIN.

Between 8:40-8:45 (9:40-9:45), by command from the FAC Command Post, the 324th FAD was scrambled, consisting of the 176th Guards FAR (14 MiG-15s) under Colonel VISHNYAKOV and the 196th FAR (12 MiG-15s) under Major MITUSOV. The 303rd and 324th FAD regiments assembled by performing 90 and 180-degree turns along the right bank of the Yalu River. After reaching an altitude of 5000-6000 m, the units were directed by course to the Anju-Taisen area. Our fighters were guided from the FAC Command Post, FAD, and Air Control Point #2. The main attention was paid to guiding them towards the bomber groups.

The combat formation of the 303rd FAD consisted of strike and cover groups, following in a “column” of regiments within visual range. The 523rd and 18th FARs were in the strike group, and the 17th FAR in the cover group. Lieutenant Colonel SMORCHKOV was appointed the senior divisional group leader. The combat formation of the 324th FAD also consisted of strike and cover groups, following in a “column” of regiments at a distance of 6-7 km. The 196th FAR was in the strike group and the 176th Guards FAR in the cover group. Colonel VISHNYAKOV was appointed the senior divisional group leader.

At 9:40 (10:40), the Guards FAR, flying at an altitude of 8000 m at the head of the strike group, in an area 20-25 km east of Tishu on head-on and intersecting courses, encountered a fighter “screen” of up to 40 F-86s, flying in “snake” formation of eights, eights in “echelon” of flights, flights in “echelon” of pairs. At the same time, the group commander, Lieutenant Colonel SMORCHKOV, detected ahead to the left at an altitude of 5000 m, 8 B-29s, flying in “front” combat formation, with intervals between aircraft of 40-50 m, on a southerly course, under direct cover of up to 30 F-84s, located to the right, left, rear, and 600-800 m above the bomber formation, in groups of 6-8 aircraft.

Assessing the situation, the group commander ordered: elements of the 1st and 3rd Air Squadrons (14 MiG-15s) to engage F-86 fighters, and the 2nd Air Squadron (6 MiG-15s) to attack the bombers. By command of the group commander, our fighters entered combat according to the adopted decision. As a result of the battle, according to pilot reports and photo control data, 2 B-29s and 2 F-84s were shot down.

At 9:43 (10:43), the 523rd FAR (18 MiG-15s) under Major OSKIN, flying at an altitude of 9000 m as part of the strike group behind the 18th Guards FAR, in the area 20-40 km southwest of Taisen, observed at an altitude of 7000 m, 8 F-86s, flying on intersecting courses. Turning the flight 90 degrees to the right, ahead, to the left, at an altitude of 5000 m, it detected 9 B-29s and up to 40 F-84s, F-86s, and Gloster “Meteor-4s”.

The B-29 combat formation: lead flight, three aircraft, in a tight “wedge” formation; the trailing six – 4000-5000 m behind and to the right of the lead flight, in a “front” combat formation (6 B-29s constituted the group attacked by our fighters). Direct escort fighters were positioned: 8 Gloster “Meteor-4s” 2000-3000 m ahead, 1000-2000 m to the right and 600-800 m above the B-29s; F-84s were to the left, right, and rear, at a distance of 1000-2000 m from the B-29s, in groups of 4-8 F-84s. Two groups of 8 F-86s in an “echelon” formation of flights patrolled to the right, behind the B-29s, at an altitude of 8000 m, at a distance of 10-15 km from them. By command of the leader, the regiment engaged enemy bombers and fighters.

As a result of the aerial combat, according to pilot reports and photo control data, 5 B-29s and 1 F-84 were shot down. Our own losses: Senior Lieutenant KHURTIN was shot down, attacked by 4 F-86s in the area 15-20 km northwest of Andong while returning to his airfield.”

Senior Pilot of the 523rd FAR, Guards Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Alexandrovich Samoylov, recalls: “…I was Os’kin’s wingman. Filimonov was supposed to fly with him, and I with Zykov as the second pair in his flight. I saw the commander taxi out, but his wingman was still standing. Others had already started taxiing out, and he was still standing. I then told Zykov to stay, and I attached myself to Os’kin as his wingman.

Upon approaching the Anju area, we were attacked by a large group of “Sabres.” They swooped down on us from above, and we engaged them in combat. During the fight, Os’kin got on the tail of an F-86 and closed in… He was almost within effective firing range, already less than 800 meters – and at that moment I saw a group of B-29s approaching the combat area from below. That there were nine of them is certain, but I don’t know if there were other groups.

I shouted to Os’kin: “The ‘big ones’ are down to the right!” He, too, obviously noticed them, stopped his attack on the F-86, and put his aircraft into a half-roll to descend; I followed him. He made a head-on attack, set one B-29 on fire, and as he maneuvered for a repeat attack, a pair of F-84s from the direct escort tried to attack him from behind. I gave them a good suppressive burst, not aiming – no time to aim, just to scare them off.

We had just over five minutes of fuel for the fight; then we had to go home. Plus, at the Yalu, there was usually a flight of six, or even more, “Sabres” on patrol, catching us as we left the battle. Well, then came the command to withdraw… Os’kin shot down two B-29s in that battle, Shevarev one, Dyachenko, and one of the pilots brought back a bullet hole in the tail – all damage from the gunners. And Khurtin… He was shot down after crossing the Yalu. He was already over Chinese territory, in the Andong area.”

From the battle description: “…At 9:45 (10:45), the 17th FAR (20 MiG-15s) under Major MASLENNIKOV, flying in the cover group at an altitude of 8500m, detected on intersecting courses a group of up to 20 F-86s, flying from the left, 500 m higher than the MiG-15s, in a “column” combat formation of eights and fours. At the same time, the regiment’s crews detected at 7000 m altitude 11 B-29s under the cover of F-84 and Gloster “Meteor-4” type fighters.

The bomber’s combat formation consisted of a “column” of flights (the first flight – three aircraft in a “wedge” formation, the second and third – four B-29s each, in a “diamond” formation). Direct cover, up to 20 F-84s, was located to the rear and above, in groups of 4-8 aircraft. 8 Gloster “Meteor-4s” followed ahead of the bomber column at 1000-2000 meters. Assessing the air situation, the group commander decided: the 2nd and 3rd Air Squadrons would attack the “screen” fighters (20 F-86s), and the 1st Air Squadron would strike the enemy bombers. By command of the leader, the regiment entered combat.

As a result of the aerial combat, according to pilot reports and photo control data, 3 B-29s, 1 F-84 were shot down, and 1 B-29 was damaged. There were no own losses. The MiG-15 aircraft, piloted by Senior Lieutenant NIKOLAEV, received one bullet hole during the aerial combat.

The 176th Guards FAR, having reached the Anju area at an altitude of 8000 m and finding no enemy, turned right and headed towards Shinbito Island. At 10:08 (11:08), 10 km east of the island, the regiment detected two F-80s and two F-86s, which were spotted by Captain SUCHKOV’s flight. The battle was inconclusive, as enemy fighters withdrew into the clouds after the first attack.

The 196th FAR, while over the Singuiju area at an altitude of 7000 meters, detected an F-86 that was trying to attack a pair of MiG-15s from the 303rd FAD withdrawing from the combat area. When the group turned towards the F-86, the latter ceased its approach, executed a roll, and departed at increased speed towards the sea. Upon approaching the Anju area, at an altitude of 8000-9000 m, the leader was informed that the enemy was withdrawing south. Following this direction, the regiment had no encounter with the enemy.

Our fighters’ attacks on enemy bombers and fighters were mainly carried out from the rear hemisphere, at angles from 0/4 to 3/4; fire was conducted from ranges of 1000 to 400 meters, with two or three medium bursts using the movable reticle sight. Attacks on enemy aircraft were carried out by flights and pairs, with mutual support throughout the engagement. Our fighters fought using vertical maneuvers. Control was exercised by group, squadron, and flight commanders.

Between 9:48-10:08 (10:48-11:08), according to estimated time, the corps command post issued the command for each regiment to disengage from combat. To repel the concentrated enemy air raid, 84 MiG-15s took off; 72 pilots participated in the aerial combat, and 36 fired. The duration of aerial combat for the units was 10-15 minutes. As a result of the aerial combat, 14 enemy aircraft were shot down, including: 10 B-29s, 4 F-84s, and one B-29 damaged. Our losses – one MiG-15 crew (Senior Lieutenant KHURTIN). Ammunition expenditure: N-37 shells – 865 units, NS-23 shells – 2619 units. Weather conditions: cloudiness 8-10 points, altitude 3000-4000 meters, visibility up to 10 km.

Assessment and Consequences of the Black Week

Open foreign publications traditionally provide different descriptions and outcomes of the battle. Robert Jackson, in his book “Air War over Korea,” writes: “…At 9:00, eight B-29s of the 307th Bomber Wing met an escort of 55 “Thunderjets” from the 49th and 136th Air Wings and set course for Namsi airfield. Far ahead and above them, 34 “Sabres” of the 4th Air Wing established a fighter “screen” along the south bank of the Yalu.

Unexpectedly, at 9:15, over a hundred MiGs crossed the river, and within minutes “Sabre” pilots were effectively engaged in battle, fighting for their lives. During this battle, in which two MiGs were shot down, another 50 MiGs passed to the B-29 and F-84 group and took up position at some distance, possibly hoping to draw the “Thunderjets” away from the bombers. The latter, however, did not take the challenge, and moments later the MiGs furiously attacked from all directions.

For the B-29 gunners, the next 20 minutes were a true nightmare. MiGs, piercing the helpless F-84 escort, repeatedly poured cannon fire on the bombers, desperately heading for their target. Two B-29s were shot down seconds after dropping their bombs; a third, burning like a torch, pulled towards the coast, where crew members abandoned the aircraft – all except the pilot, Captain Thomas L. Shields, who, sacrificing himself, held the riddled machine in the air to the last and thus saved the others.

One “Thunderjet” also did not return from the sortie. Four MiGs were credited as shot down – three by B-29 gunners and one by an F-84 pilot. The remaining bombers, all heavily damaged, with the sad cargo of killed and wounded on board, made emergency landings in South Korea and Japan. For Bomber Command, this was the most terrible day since the beginning of the war.”

It should be noted that Jackson’s words about the desperate breakthrough of “Superfortress” crews to the target under fire from countless MiGs are merely author’s license. The bombers were intercepted already on their way back from the target.

Although different authors credit the defensive fire of the “Superfortresses” with three to five MiGs, officially only two gunners received one victory each – Sergeant Fred R. Spivey and Staff Sergeant Jerry M. Webb, both from the 371st Squadron. One MiG was credited to an F-84 pilot from the direct escort group, 1st Lieutenant Farrie D. Fortner. In addition, “Sabre” pilots from the 336th Squadron, Major Richard D. Creighton and Captain Ralph E. Banks, each earned one victory. Our actual losses were: one MiG shot down and 3 damaged.

Now let’s turn to the Americans. Probably, the figure of three lost B-29s was first named by Robert Frank Futrell. From the second half of the 1950s, he wrote individual chapters on the war for several collections, both on the general history of the US Air Force and on its use in Korea, and then published his classic work “The US Air Force in Korea, 1950-53”. His works became the main source of information for many Western authors, and the figure of losses on October 23, accordingly, migrated into their books.

However, we have serious doubts about its veracity. Many Western sources report that the losses incurred on October 23 forced Bomber Command to switch to exclusively night B-29 sorties into “MiG Alley” until the very end of the war, and “Black Tuesday” was the last day “Superfortresses” flew to the Yalu in daylight.

In reality, bombers still appeared in the 64th FAC’s area of operation on October 24 and 27, but their losses on those days were incomparably lighter. Thus, October 23, 1951, truly became a turning point for the history of B-29 daylight raids. But why this particular day, when for Bomber Command, the results of the battles on March 1 and April 12 seemed no less tragic?

In our opinion, this is explained by a much higher level of actual losses compared to official ones.

American veterans, eyewitnesses to “Black Tuesday,” offer another version of events. Harold E. Fischer, then a “Shooting Star” pilot from the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, recalled: “On one of the most terrible days for our Air Force, a large group of 12 aircraft flew into North Korea under F-86 cover. On their way back from the target, they were met by enemy MiG-15s in excellent four-aircraft flights, which made several attacks on the B-29 group, paying no attention to the fighter escort, which proved to be completely ineffective.

The MiGs fired cannons without even entering the B-29’s defensive machine gun fire zone, and the bomber gunners were helpless against such tactics. It was a clash of World War II aircraft with modern jet fighters. Eight B-29s were shot down, and the rest were so seriously damaged that they did not dare to fly across the sea to Okinawa and landed at advanced airbases in South Korea.

Later, we flew out to search for B-29 crew members who had abandoned their riddled machines over the sea. We flew in formation from Chodo Island along the coast to the mouth of the Yalu and back at a few feet altitude, peering painfully into the waves, but could not spot a single life vest. Due to the low altitude, the search time was severely limited, and to our great regret, we were soon forced to leave the area.

The only aircraft we encountered was a rescue “Dumbo”, also engaged in searching for crews. The “Dumbo” left the area after us, fearing that MiGs might return and shoot it down. We set course for base and gained altitude, feeling bitterness and understanding that something in tactics needed to be changed – either increase and improve escort, or stop daylight raids and switch to night ones. And so it happened that this was the last time B-29s appeared in the sky during the day.”

According to the testimony of one B-29 crew member, shot down by anti-aircraft fire on January 23, 1952, in October 1951, for a week, Bomber Command lost “Superfortresses” on every sortie, and on “Black Tuesday,” losses from MiGs amounted to nine aircraft.

As Carroll’s Alice said – “curiouser and curiouser.” Now, not counting ours, we have three Western versions of the event, and almost polar versions at that. The truth, however, often lies in the middle. One more, final interpretation of the October 23 battle results, we find in Larry Davis. He reports: “…By the end of the battle, all B-29s sustained heavy damage. Three of them were lost over the target, and four more crashed at South Korean airbases. The remaining three made it to Kadena, but were written off and scrapped.

Thus, the MiGs destroyed the entire B-29 group. That night an order appeared – no more daylight sorties into “MiG Alley” itself, nor into adjacent areas. Furthermore, Davis, speaking of the total B-29 losses in aerial combat in Korea, writes: “Officially, their losses were very light – 17 aircraft over three years of conflict. But this number only includes those that fell in North Korea or enemy-occupied territory. Aircraft that crashed into the waters of the Yellow and Sea of Japan or crashed in South Korea were not considered lost in battle. Nor were aircraft that, due to heavy damage, were written off upon returning home, considered losses.”

Taking this statement into account, we should perhaps say that on October 23, 1951, 10 B-29s flew to North Korea, of which three were lost, and the rest… let’s say, were removed from Bomber Command’s inventory. It sounds a bit crazy, but it’s quite a compromise for all parties.

As for the discrepancy with our documents regarding the number of bombers, it seems to us that it should be acknowledged that all three regiments attacked the same group. Moreover, none of the regiments correctly determined the number of aircraft in it – a situation that for any war is more the rule than the exception. However, it is quite possible that at the regiment level the number of B-29s was accurately determined, and the confusion was caused by the consolidation of regimental reports into divisional ones, which were then compiled into a single corps-level description of the aerial battle.

From the corps description provided above, it follows that the regiments of the 303rd division, successively entering battle, encountered groups of 8, 9, and 11 bombers, respectively. Since the number of B-29s increased, it gives the impression that they were in three different groups – otherwise, one group, passing “through the ranks” of Soviet regiments, should have dwindled.

Let’s start with the 18th Guards Regiment, which encountered the “Superfortresses” first. The corps description states that the group consisted of eight B-29s in a “front” formation. Frankly, such a formation does not allow for an effective defensive fire system. However, to accuse the enemy of foolishness would be wrong. It is probable that the 18th Guards FAR encountered the bombers as they were turning and heading back after bombing. And then it is quite possible that the B-29s were miscounted, and some of them, having gone ahead, remained unnoticed. This version becomes even more probable if one considers such unfavorable conditions for counting as detecting B-29s on head-on courses and mediocre visibility.

Three minutes later, the 523rd regiment encountered a group of nine B-29s – a new group, according to the logic of the corps’ battle description. But, according to the divisional description, the 523rd FAR detected 9 bombers “in a tight combat formation: the lead B-29 flight in a tight “wedge” formation; the trailing group of 6 B-29s, previously attacked by Lieutenant Colonel SMORCHKOV’s group, followed at a distance of 4-5 km behind to the right at an interval of 400-600 m in a “front of flights” combat formation.”

Two minutes later, the 17th FAR entered combat, its target being eleven B-29s. But in the divisional description, compiled based on regimental reports, it was initially reported that the group consisted of only eight “Superfortresses”! However, the number 8 was then corrected in pencil to 11, and in this form it migrated to the Corps headquarters. Thus, the number of bombers in the group did decrease, which provides grounds to assert that the group was a single one.

According to A. P. Smorchkov, the regimental group commanders who returned from the October 23 sortie “…could confidently speak at most about the actions of their own groups. Each sortie was analyzed by us, and necessary conclusions were drawn – but only for our own regiment. Overall, we had a very brief understanding of the actions of our neighbors. All of this was done at division and corps headquarters. Consequently, throughout the entire period of combat operations, there were no conferences to generalize combat experience, as we were constantly ready for the next sortie. And then – a sudden end for us and return to our Homeland.”