Bulgarian Aviation in the First Balkan War

Early Steps of Bulgarian Aviation

The first aviation units in the Bulgarian army appeared in 1909, almost simultaneously with leading European states. Bulgaria closely monitored the development of aeronautics in other countries. A contemporary journal, in an article titled “Aeronautics and Military Affairs,” stated: “aerostats and airplanes will bring about a great revolution in both field and fortress warfare, as well as in naval matters. An army that fails to gain air supremacy will live in demoralizing anxiety and feel constant fear overhead.”

Thus, in 1906, a balloon section was established with an initial staff of 37 people. On the eve of the Balkan War, it possessed a 640 m³ “Godard” type balloon supplied from France and another balloon, named “Sofia-1”, made in Bulgaria from Russian materials with the same volume. In November 1910, Russian pilot Boris Maslennikov arrived in the country at the invitation of the Ministry of War, making several successful flights on a “Farman”. Maslennikov proposed supplying five aircraft and organizing a workshop for their production, which also included establishing a flight school. However, the price of 250,000 leva seemed excessively high to the Bulgarians, and his projects were rejected.

In the first half of the following year, Major Vasil Rankov was sent to France to study the state of aeronautical affairs. He was also tasked with preparing proposals for the development of Bulgarian military aviation. The Italians’ use of aviation in the Italo-Turkish War provided another impetus for organizing their own air force. Two Bulgarian officers, General Staff Captain Alexander Ganchev and Navy Lieutenant Nedelcho Nedev, were seconded to the Italian headquarters. They engaged in intensive activity; Ganchev, for example, sent over 50 reports containing various information on the combat operations of aircraft, captive balloons, and airships in the Italian army. By the end of 1911, the final decision was made to create Bulgarian aviation, and the Ministry of War focused on two directions: the supply of new equipment and the training of personnel.

In the first quarter of 1912, the government allocated 100,000 leva for the purchase of 4-5 aircraft. Simultaneously, calculations were made for the formation of an aviation detachment. In peacetime, it was planned to have 4-5 aircraft (1-2 for pilot training, 1 reserve, and 1-2 under repair), and in wartime, 3-5 machines for each army. The training of pilots and mechanics was fraught with difficulties and was not systematically organized, with each individual commencing their training between April and August. In total, 13 pilots, 6 mechanics, and 2 balloonists were sent to Germany, England, France, and Russia. Flight training typically occurred at flight schools affiliated with the factories manufacturing the purchased aircraft. However, what kind of training was it! In his memoirs, pilot Radul Milkov writes: “Flight training in Germany lasted 12 flying days, during which I flew 3 hours.”

In August of that same year, the first Bulgarian aircraft, a Blériot XXI, arrived in the country, on which Lieutenant Simeon Petrov made the first flight on the 13th. Although the Aviation Detachment (AO) was not fully formed, aircraft participated in the large September military maneuvers. When general mobilization was declared in Bulgaria on September 17, 1912, aviation was in a state of deployment. According to the 1910 establishment, the air forces were to be represented by two balloon sections attached to the railway troops, with a total personnel of 303. In fact, only one Balloon Section (BO) was created, commanded by Captain Yordan Kazandjiev, equipped with two aerostats—a “Godard” and the “Sofia-1″—both unsuitable for maneuverable combat operations.

The 1st AO was also in the process of formation. According to wartime establishment, it should have 62 personnel, including 3 pilots, 3 aircraft, a repair workshop, etc. In reality, only the Blériot flown by Lieutenant Simeon Petrov, commander of the 1st AO, represented combat value. However, before the start of the war (October 3), two more pilots, Lieutenants Hristo Toprakchiev and Nikifor Bogdanov, completed their training. Additionally, a few days later, Lieutenants R. Milkov and Lyudmil Lulchev returned, and later another 8 individuals (though some had not fully mastered the equipment and flew as observers).

Thus, at the beginning of active combat operations, the Bulgarian army could count on 5 pilots and a limited number of mechanics, despite the military establishment stipulating the presence of 9-12 aircraft and a corresponding number of pilots. Therefore, the Bulgarian government resorted to a method as old as time: the recruitment of foreign volunteers. This situation was documented in Order No. 25 of the active army, dated October 10, 1912, which also approved the “Statute for Voluntary Service.” By contract, 23 individuals (13 pilots and 10 mechanics) were enlisted for military service, most of whom proved completely unsuitable for combat operations. For example, the Russian volunteer detachment, formed by the director of the First Russian Aeronautical Society S. Shchetinin, consisted of 10 people (4 pilots and 6 mechanics) with five “Farman” aircraft (one spare, without an engine). Of this detachment, only two pilots performed a limited number of combat sorties. The detachment did not operate as an independent unit, and after the formation of three AOs, the pilots were assigned to them. Moreover, at that time, a large number of aviation specialists from other countries also performed flights in the country but were not documented as volunteers.

In total, 29 aircraft were delivered in a short period. This impressive fleet could have been supplemented by two Turkish “Harlan” type aircraft, confiscated from a transit train. However, Bulgarian pilots, after test flights, deemed these aircraft unsuitable for combat operations.

Initial Air Operations and Challenges

Active combat operations in the southeastern strategic direction began on October 5. According to war plans against Turkey, the main forces of the Bulgarian 1st and 3rd armies, after a three-day forced march, were to advance in the Tundzha operational direction. They succeeded, and in engagements between October 9 and 12, the Bulgarians defeated the Turkish Eastern Army. On October 11, Lozengrad, a strategically important objective, was captured. The Second Operational Army was engaged in besieging the Edirne (Adrianople) fortress and thwarting Turkish attempts to threaten the rear of the 1st and 3rd armies. At this point, the Bulgarian command, lacking a real understanding of the enemy’s situation, halted the advance. This was a grave tactical error, as it allowed Turkish units to regroup and occupy new defensive positions. At this juncture, the only “eyes” of the command were provided by the airplane detachment, but it was not yet fully combat-ready.

Pilots Toprakchiev and Bogdanov remained at the Simeonovgrad airfield with a single “Blériot” (the second had crashed during a test flight on October 3), while Simeon Petrov was seconded to Russia to purchase new aircraft. From October 5 to 11, bad weather—clouds and rain—made any flights impossible. Until the 15th, only one “Albatros” had been test-flown, but only the detachment commander, Lieutenant Radul Milkov, had experience flying it. Therefore, in the Balkan War, balloons were the first to be used, despite spherical balloons being unsuitable for warfare as they depend on meteorological conditions and are used exclusively for battlefield observation and artillery fire correction. On October 15, at 9 AM, the “Sofia-1” was raised at a position 2 km southeast of Duvandzha village, its crew transmitting information about the Turkish defensive line.

Until the first armistice, “Sofia-1” performed several tasks over 10 combat days. For the rest of the time, meteorological conditions were unsuitable—rain and fog—(observations could only be conducted with wind speeds not exceeding 5-6 m/s). Observation was carried out using ordinary binoculars, and there was no telephone communication with the ground. Attempts were made to photograph Turkish positions with a camera, but without success, as a common camera was used. On October 16, Turkish artillery opened fire on the aerostat, but no hits were recorded. However, Turkish troops advanced to within about two kilometers and inflicted casualties on the service personnel: there were dead and wounded. By the time of the first armistice, the aerostat was damaged and sent for repair.

On October 16, the AO began its combat career. On that day, Lieutenant Milkov flew a reconnaissance mission in an “Albatros.” He described his flight thus: “I took off at 9:30 in the direction of Edirne. As we flew over the Turkish trenches, we could see people pulling ropes, and others turning the wheels of two Turkish cannons. At a distance of 100 paces from each other, the Turks were moving these cannons into position… we were high up—400 meters—and from that height, when I looked down, I saw a sea of minarets… Since we had been in the air for almost an hour, and as a novice pilot-aviator, I did not dare to fly long and began to descend.” The next day, two “Blériot” airplanes flew reconnaissance missions in the Yurush area. Toprakchiev, to the Yurush area, and Bogdanov, to Karaagach. In this flight, Bogdanov’s aircraft came under ground fire and received 9 “harmless” bullet holes. Despite the Turks being the first to form an artillery detachment equipped with “anti-aircraft” guns, not a single Bulgarian aircraft was shot down in the war.

In the diary of the Second Army, the results of Bogdanov’s flight are presented as follows: “Today, airplane reconnaissance discovered that near Marash and Papaztepe the Turks have large camps. Near Kadykoy, 16 groups of tents were built, and in the middle of Havaraku and Sheitan Tarla, another group (of tents). East of Edirne, no enemy was detected. Artillery was also discovered near the Marash camp. The airplane was fired upon, there are many hits, but without result.” Two days after Milkov’s flight, the Russian pilot Timofey Efimov (who accompanied the purchased aircraft and was not listed among the volunteers, performing this flight for payment; he later published a report about his flight in a Bulgarian newspaper) flew a Blériot over Edirne and dropped proclamations. On this occasion, the aircraft was also fired upon but returned safely. On the same day, Lieutenants Milkov and Tarakchiev took off with the mission to fly to Viza to assist the 1st and 3rd armies, but due to bad weather, they returned. Along the way, they conducted reconnaissance of the northwestern sector of the Edirne fortress.

What impression did Bulgarian aircraft make on the Turks? In his memoirs, former infantry soldier Apostol Dimitrov said that when an airplane first appeared over Edirne, the officers of his regiment hid under a bridge. Another former soldier of the Turkish army, Vangel Simov, stated during interrogation that when Bulgarian aircraft appeared over Edirne, the soldiers were frightened by the engine noise. Three days after its first combat sortie, Bulgarian aviation suffered its first loss: Hristo Toprakchiev died in a “Blériot” (on which he had personally replaced part of the stabilizer the day before). On October 25, Milkov and Tarakchiev again tried, in an “Albatros,” to fly over Bunar Hisar, but due to bad weather conditions and very poor equipment (the aircraft didn’t even have a compass!), they could not complete the mission. The pilots lost orientation and, with a stalled engine, made an emergency landing near the village of Doganovo. As a result, the aircraft was written off.

Evolution and Combat Performance

However, despite the losses, by October 31, the Aviation Detachment had 8 trained pilots and 5-6 airplanes. With the arrival of new equipment and pilots, the idea of organizing separate aviation detachments took real shape. From November 3 to 17, four aircraft (1 “Blériot”, 2 “Farman” VII, and 1 “Sommer”) flew first to Chorlu, and then to Kabakchakyoy. With them traveled 4 pilots (the Bulgarian Simeon Petrov, the Russians Pyotr Evsyukov and Fyodor Kolchin, and the Swiss Ernest Bury). Also accompanying them were 3 observers: Dimitar Sakelarov, Gavril Stoyanovich, and Nikola Mankov. This was the basis for the formation of the 2nd AO. Because the “Blériot” was damaged during landing, the newly formed unit could not participate in the attack on the Çatalca position on November 4 and 5.

At this time, a semi-humorous story arose that the cause of a series of victories (including the capture of impregnable Edirne) was the battle cry with which Bulgarian infantry went into battle: “Forward with the bayonet!” (Напред на нож), which the Turks perceived as “Five with the bayonet!” (По пятина на штык). The story of this “misunderstanding” is as follows: A correspondent from a French newspaper visited a Bulgarian unit at the front. Together with the lieutenants, he uncorked a bottle of French cognac, and they drank a few glasses “to get acquainted.” Suddenly, two breathless soldiers entered and reported: “Lieutenant, a large enemy camp is approaching us!” “How big is it, boys?” asked the lieutenant as he emerged from the dugout. “Very, very big!” “How much bigger, boys?” exclaimed the lieutenant. “Approximately five times bigger than us, Lieutenant!” “Well, then,” said the lieutenant, fixed his bayonet on his “Manlicher” and shouted: “And now, boys, ‘Five to the bayonet!'” leading the soldiers in a counterattack. The Frenchman wrote about this in his newspaper, and thus the story began.

November 14 was marked by the simultaneous reconnaissance flight of three aircraft over Edirne. The Italian Sabelli flew with observer Lieutenant Lulchev, Lieutenant Milkov with observer Tarakchiev, and Lieutenant Kalinov with observer Lieutenant Mitev. The aircraft were likely a “Blériot”, an “Albatros”, and a “Voisin”. The mission was not completed due to poor meteorological conditions. The previous day, for the same reasons, the Kolchev-Lulchev crew also failed to complete their task.

November 17 marks a watershed moment in the history of Bulgarian aviation. Up to this point, airplanes were used exclusively for reconnaissance, and thereafter, they became bombers. On this day, two aircraft flew in the direction of Edirne. The first, an “Albatros,” was piloted by R. Milkov with the correspondent of the English newspaper “Daily Sketch,” Hor, as a passenger. The second “Blériot” was operated by Sabelli with the observer, head of the aeronautical park, Major Zlatarov. From the “Albatros,” Hor took several photographs of Turkish positions, but “after the flight, Mr. Hor came to the airfield and sadly told me that the photos had not turned out” (R. Milkov’s memoirs). However, just the following week, these photographs appeared in the English newspaper. The Bulgarians took several very successful aerial photographs over Edirne using a camera designed by Russian Lieutenant Ulyanov, but one day the camera’s shutter was lost, and the practice had to be stopped. None of these photographs have survived to this day.

Meanwhile, the second crew of the second airplane, over the fortress, along with proclamations, dropped two hand grenades (designed by N. Tyufekchiev). The reaction of the besieged to the first bombardment is attested to by the statements of S. Slavenkov, who was mobilized by the Turks and worked on the fortress fortifications: “The Turks are very afraid of airplanes. When they see them, they immediately hide. The Topçu Yüzbaşı (artillery captain) initially encouraged everyone, but when he saw the first large grenade fall in the city, he also got scared and said: ‘Çocuklar işimiz bozuktur’ (translated from Turkish: ‘Boys, that’s enough for us!’).” On the same day, the first armistice of this war was signed, lasting two months. During this time, a complex diplomatic game unfolded, against the backdrop of which the parties prepared for the continuation of hostilities. Bulgarian aviation used the respite to reflect on combat experience and prepare for the second phase of the war.

All 29 purchased aircraft were received, delivered from France (1 “Blériot” XI, 1 “Blériot” XXI, 2 “Blériot” Xi-2, 1 “Voisin”, 1 “Sommer”), England (1 “Bristol”), Germany (4 “Albatros” F.II), and Russia (1 “Blériot” XI-bis, 2 “Blériot” XI-2bis, 5 “Farman” VII, 2 “Nieuport” IV, 8 “Blériot”). Officially, the Air Force comprised 13 pilots: 5 Bulgarians and 8 foreigners. On this basis, a new structure was formed, consisting of three airplane detachments. By the end of the armistice, their structure was as follows: early that same month, to reinforce the 3rd AO, the command sent a “Farman” piloted by the Russian N. Kostin. However, the pilot lost orientation and landed in the vicinity of Edirne, falling into captivity. In December, a kite balloon with the necessary equipment was received as a gift from Russia. A Russian mechanic also arrived for its maintenance. Based on the existing materiel, two BOs were formed: the first with the “Sofia-1” aerostat (commander Yu. Kazandjiev) and the second with the newly received kite balloon (commander Prodan Tarakchiev). During the armistice, the first aviation bombs designed by engineer Helgar also arrived from Russia: “heavy” ones weighing 1.5 kg and “light” ones weighing 0.250 kg. Additionally, in Sofia, 50 bombs were assembled according to the project of the then-renowned explosives specialist S. Velichko.

The Young Turk coup d’état on January 10, 1913, marked the end of the armistice and the beginning of the second period of the war. On January 21, hostilities resumed, and the initiative passed to the Turks. According to the command’s plan, the main task was to unblock the Edirne fortress. Anticipating such developments, the Bulgarians began a general retreat towards the Çatalca area. In the second period, the 1st AO was transferred to the command of the 2nd army and performed tasks in the Edirne area. The detachment lacked a flight observer, which negatively affected the effectiveness of aircraft use. In total, between January 22 and March 12, the 1st AO made only 19 sorties due to bad weather. The main task remained reconnaissance, although some bombs and proclamations were dropped. During the decisive assault on Edirne on March 12, pilots performed three reconnaissance flights over enemy positions. With the fortress’s capitulation the next day, this detachment’s participation in the Balkan War also ended.

After the start of active combat operations, the 2nd AO relocated from Chorlu to its main airfield near Cherkezköy. On January 24, F. Kolchin flew in a “Farman” and S. Petrov in a “Blériot,” and on February 8, Bury and G. Stoyanov in a “Sommer.” This detachment proved to be the most effective, despite its smaller composition (on February 16, the Russians F. Kolchin and P. Evsyukov, along with mechanics, returned to their homeland). In 18 days, the 2nd AO performed 27 combat sorties (as many as the other two combined). The second detachment, on paper, was subordinate to the command of the 3rd army, but in fact carried out tasks for the General Staff. All its activity was related to reconnaissance of the Çatalca position, between the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, under conditions of positional warfare. Just two days after the redeployment, S. Petrov in a “Blériot” conducted reconnaissance in the northern part of the position. The aircraft came under ground fire, but without result. From January 25 to 27, Petrov in a “Blériot” and Kolchin in a “Farman” performed several more sorties in this area. In February, due to bad weather, no one flew, with the exception of Bury, who made one reconnaissance flight of the southern position. In this flight, his aircraft was fired upon from the ground by Bulgarian troops (fortunately, inaccurately).

After the long February “holidays,” the detachment developed intense activity. Thus, as a result of Bury’s reconnaissance of the northern sector of the Çatalca position on March 2, the commander of the 3rd army concluded that the enemy had retreated from its main position and proposed that Bulgarian troops reoccup the heights west of Çatalca. The command, once again, did not trust air reconnaissance and gave preference to ground reconnaissance, which stated that enemy forces in this area were much larger. However, after another reconnaissance flight three days later (again, Bury distinguished himself, apparently the best prepared) and comparing data obtained from other sources, the command was convinced that air reconnaissance was not lying. Thanks to this, on March 10, the vanguard of the 1st Army went on the offensive. The following days were marked by repeated reconnaissance flights. Air reconnaissance once again proved its effectiveness: S. Petrov and Bury almost simultaneously covered the front in the depth of the Çatalca position, establishing the fact of the enemy’s retreat. After the fall of Edirne, the main objective became Constantinople.

The capital was 60 km from the Cherkezköy airfield (a very long distance for aircraft of that time), so it was decided to organize a forward airfield at Kabakchakyoy. For this, a special train with gasoline and oil was sent. The first attempt to bomb Constantinople was made on March 14, but since the aircraft took off too late (16:25 Bury in a “Farman” and 18:25 S. Petrov in a “Blériot”), due to the onset of darkness, the pilots were forced to return (already in the dark, Bury landed at Kabakchakyoy, and Petrov at Cherkezköy). The next day, Bury finally reached the capital and circled. He was pursued by a Turkish aircraft, but the pilot successfully broke away from it. The detachment’s diary notes on this matter: “On the way back, he was pursued by a Turkish airplane to Çatalca and Kabakcha, but it did not catch him… The closest distance at which the Turkish aircraft was located was 3 km.” The General Staff proposed bombing the Turkish capital with the aim of forcing the Turkish government to cease hostilities and establish a separate peace. In connection with this, a bombing raid was planned for March 26, to be carried out by Bury in a “Sommer.” However, these plans were not destined to materialize.

The Third AO was responsible for interaction with the 4th army on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Its main task was reconnaissance of coastal areas. Its composition was international: Italian pilot D. Sabelli and observers, Russian M. Mitev and Bulgarian P. Popkrustev. Due to late redeployment, the first combat sortie was performed only on January 28, 1913 (Sabelli and Mitev). However, combat operations at the Bulair position had already effectively ended (it should be recalled that the Turks landed there on January 26, but after a series of failures, they were evacuated on the 29th). During the temporary lull, the detachment, in the form of a single crew, carried out reconnaissance of the Bulair position, observed the movements of the Turkish fleet, and clarified the state of important defensive structures—the “Victoria” and “Napoleon” forts. To quickly deliver the collected information and demonstrate the capabilities of the new weapon, on March 1, after reconnaissance, Sabelli and Popkrustev landed near the village of Kavak and reported personally to Crown Prince Boris (father of the current Bulgarian Prime Minister, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha), Prince Kirill, and the commanders of the 4th army and the 7th infantry division. Almost every time, reconnaissance was accompanied by bombing of various targets—mainly bivouacs. Very often, the aircraft came under ground fire, but without success. On March 14, after the capitulation of Edirne, a special flight was made over the Bulair position, during which leaflets announcing the fortress’s capitulation were dropped. The last combat sortie of Bulgarian aviation in this war took place on March 23. The aviators’ task was to verify information that Turkish units were withdrawing from the Gallipoli Peninsula. During the “intercontinental” flight (as described in documents, though it’s commonly known that Europe and Asia form a single continent, Eurasia), two bombs were dropped on Gallipoli and Lapseki. In the second period of the war, aerostats were used limitedly due to poor meteorological conditions and various subjective factors. On January 21, due to a supply error (hydrochloric acid was delivered instead of sulfuric acid), several service personnel suffered poisoning. Then, for three days, combat work was paralyzed due to squabbles between the respective heads of the engineering troops and the aeronautical park regarding position selection. Ultimately, the balloon sections were based as follows: the 1st BO near Akbunar village, and the 2nd BO near Demirhanly village. During the assault on Edirne, no balloons were raised, as due to continuous artillery fire, their usefulness would have been minimal. And after the fortress fell, personnel were engaged in assembling and repairing captured apparatus.

To conclude the story of Bulgarian aviation’s participation in the war, I would like to offer some statistics. A total of 76 documented combat sorties were performed over 51 combat days. Of the 29 aircraft, 20 participated in these. From the initial roster of 26 pilots (12 Bulgarians and 14 foreigners), 10 actually participated in the war: 5 Bulgarians and 5 foreigners. Regarding the number of combat sorties, the record belongs to S. Petrov with 18 combat sorties, followed by Bury with 13, Sabelli with 11, R. Milkov with 10, N. Bogdanov with 8, S. Kalinov with 8, F. Kolchin with 3, and one sortie each for H. Toprakchiev, T. Efimov, and N. Kostin.