The Battle of Britain

RAF’s Advanced Defensive System

In previous military campaigns, the Luftwaffe operated as a supplement to the active ground army, with fighter pilots primarily tasked with gaining and maintaining air superiority to support ground operations. Their success was greatly aided by the rapid advance of German troops, which disrupted enemy communications, interrupted ammunition supplies, and threatened the capture of Allied airfields.

This time, everything changed: Wehrmacht units were halted on the English Channel coast, forcing the Luftwaffe to operate independently. While peace negotiations were underway, German aviation exerted pressure on the defiant islanders.

After the negotiations failed, the Luftwaffe was required to create the necessary conditions for a subsequent German invasion of southern Britain. Hitler’s Directive of July 16, 1940, stated: ‘The English air forces must be weakened to such an extent that they will not be able to offer any significant resistance to the advancing troops…’ Thus, the prerequisites for the first purely aerial combat campaign in history were created.

However, the Luftwaffe high command failed to consider a number of significant factors. This time, they were opposed in the air by a numerous, determined, and well-trained enemy, possessing fighter aircraft that were equal to or superior in flight performance to German combat machines. Moreover, this adversary had a developed air observation, warning, and communication system (WNOS), based on a network of radar stations and observation posts.

It also featured a sophisticated fighter control system, which deprived the attacking enemy of their former advantage in initiative and surprise. At the beginning of the battle, RAF Fighter Command was divided into three air groups, which later grew to four: No. 11 Group covered London and Southeast England, No. 10 Group covered Southwest England and Wales, and No. 12 Group was responsible for the defense of East and Central England, while No. 13 Group defended Northern England and Scotland.

Each air group was responsible for the defense of its assigned area, and a centralized command system allowed squadrons from one group to be transferred to reinforce another. In battle, individual squadrons were controlled from sector command posts located within each group’s operational area. Due to technical reasons, each sector could simultaneously control only four squadrons.

However, the squadrons themselves were not fixed to sectors and could move freely throughout the group’s airspace, or redeploy to adjacent areas subordinate to other groups if necessary. The flexibility of this system was its main advantage. The front line of the detection system was a chain of radar stations aimed at sea. These could detect enemy aircraft involved in an air raid at a significant distance and pinpoint their location quite accurately, though errors often occurred regarding flight altitude and the number of enemy machines.

As soon as enemy aircraft reached the British coast, they were immediately spotted by observation posts. All reports were transmitted to the information processing department, where data was analyzed and then forwarded to the headquarters of the relevant air group. Group command would then instruct the sectors on which squadrons to scramble and against which enemy formations to direct them.

This most advanced system of its time had one small drawback: a four-minute time delay (corresponding to a typical bomber group’s flight distance of approximately 19 km) between the initial target detection and its plotting on command post maps. Controllers had to account for this delay when sending fighter squadrons into battle.

At the very beginning of the Battle of Britain, No. 11 Group had five squadrons of Spitfires, thirteen squadrons of Hurricanes, one squadron of Defiants, and three squadrons of Blenheims. No. 10 Group consisted of three squadrons of Spitfires and two squadrons of Hurricanes. This quantity represented less than half of Fighter Command’s aircraft; another 28 fighter squadrons were part of No. 12 and No. 13 Groups. By this time, Blenheim aircraft had been mainly reassigned to night flight operations.

Tactical Engagements and Key Figures

RAF fighter tactics were inferior to those of German fighter aviation. A typical squadron combat formation included twelve aircraft, divided into two groups, each consisting of two sections of three aircraft flying in a tight, so-called ‘V’-formation. The experience of battles in France led to the use of special escort fighters—a section or individual aircraft—to cover the rear, but subsequent events showed their great vulnerability, and they were soon abandoned.

During the Battle of Britain, some squadrons began to use extended ‘V’-formations of three streams of four aircraft in flight. In combat, these quartets easily split into ‘pairs’. This was already progress, but such formations made little impression on German fighter pilots; moreover, they called them ‘idiotic ranks’.

Officially, the Battle of Britain began on July 10, 1940, and concluded on October 31. Of course, it cannot be said that in practice everything happened day by day, but four distinct periods of the battle are discernible. The first covered the time when Luftwaffe units were transferred to airfields in France and the Benelux countries to prepare for a decisive assault.

This period consisted primarily of raids on Allied naval convoys in the English Channel and the Thames Estuary, as well as raids by German fighters into southeastern England to probe the strength of enemy defenses. The main combat load fell to JG 51 under the command of Theo Osterkamp, a World War I ace and recipient of the Pour le Mérite. Later, other air units were assigned to support JG 51.

Hitler’s Directive No. 17 of August 17 emphasized that the Luftwaffe must ‘use all available forces to destroy the British Air Force as quickly as possible’. This triggered the second phase of the air battle, or ‘Eagle Attack’, aimed at destroying RAF fighter aviation. This was to be achieved through a series of massive bombardments of radar stations, airfields, and other military facilities, without which the participation of English fighters in air combat would be unthinkable. The German air attack, scheduled for August 10, was temporarily postponed due to bad weather.

The third stage of the Battle of Britain unfolded in early September. This time, the full might of the Luftwaffe’s bomber forces was directed against London. When this action also failed, and cold autumn conditions made sea operations impossible, the planned German invasion of England was canceled. Raids on the British capital continued until the end of the month. Subsequently, the main emphasis shifted to night bombings, and the fourth phase primarily consisted of isolated fighter-bomber attacks, which became rare with the onset of winter cold.

Phase 1: Early July – August 10, 1940

The first fighter engagements of the Battle of Britain occurred on July 4, 1940, when in a series of individual aerial duels, one English Hurricane was shot down and four Spitfires were damaged, two of them so severely that the pilots had to make forced landings. The Messerschmitt Bf 109s participating in these battles suffered no damage. The pattern repeated three days later when Bf 109E fighters from JG 51 attacked a trio of Spitfires from the British 54th Squadron near Deal, shooting down two and damaging the third aircraft. Later that same day, ‘free hunters’ from Groups II and III/JG 51 clashed in the air with Spitfires from the 65th Squadron, destroying three British fighters again without any losses.

This was a promising start for the Germans, but it couldn’t last long. The very next day, the British shot down four Messerschmitt Bf 109s and damaged a fifth, though the wounded German pilot managed to land the machine. British losses amounted to three destroyed aircraft and one damaged. Then, on July 10, fierce battles began, which led this day to be considered the official start of the Battle of Britain. Against a naval convoy passing near Dover, the Germans deployed a group of Do 17 bombers, escorted by approximately 20 Bf 109s from III/JG 51 under the command of Spanish veteran Hannes Trautloft, and 30 Bf 110s from I/ZG 26.

The six Hurricanes covering the convoy were numerically far inferior to the enemy, but units from three more British squadrons soon joined the Hurricanes, thus bringing the number of English aircraft to 30. The Bf 110s, vulnerable in combat with single-seat fighters, immediately formed a defensive circle, with the tail of each aircraft now protected by the guns of the comrade flying behind.

This traditional stratagem of Bf 110 pilots became the subject of harsh criticism, based on the argument that this escort fighter was often incapable of defending even itself in open aerial combat. But the truth was far more complex. In a circle, the ‘110’ pilots occupied a dominant position in the sky: they were not only difficult to attack, but they could also launch an attack themselves at the first opportunity.

The circle formed by the German aircraft was very large, more than 1.5 kilometers in diameter, and posed a significant threat to the enemy on the ground. In the subsequent fierce engagement, where Spitfires and Hurricanes outnumbered the German single-seat fighters, English pilots, during their attacks, anxiously glanced at the Bf 110s, which indirectly influenced the course of the air battle. As the circle expanded in size, it became easier to break, which we would soon see. The end result was that the defensive circle described by the German aircraft did not close in one place: by expanding it, it could be moved in any direction!

In summary, the defensive circle was appropriate and justified under two conditions: if it was not excessively large, and if the battles took place over the English Channel or the English coast. Only when air operations began to move deeper into the island’s territory did the maneuver become a hindrance, as the Bf 110s became vulnerable to the British when exiting combat to return home.

The attack on the naval convoy proved unsuccessful: the Germans only managed to sink one small vessel, losing two Dorniers and severely damaging another. III-/JG 51 also lost one aircraft—the one piloted by Oberfeldwebel Dau, Trautloft’s wingman, who came under fire from a Hurricane fighter of the British 56th Squadron. He later recalled: ‘The coolant temperature suddenly shot up to 120 degrees. The cockpit filled with an unbearable smell of burning insulation. However, I still managed to glide to the coast and belly-land the machine near Boulogne. When I got out, the plane was already engulfed in flames, and a few seconds later, there was a loud explosion’.

Another pilot, an NCO from III/JG 51, belly-landed his aircraft near Cap Gris Nez. Of the Messerschmitt Bf 110s, one was shot down and crashed into the sea, while a second suffered serious damage. According to German claims, Luftwaffe fighters shot down six enemy aircraft in this engagement, including two victories credited to one of their best sharpshooters, Walter Oesau. However, in reality, British losses were minimal: one Hurricane was destroyed in a clash with a Dornier, two damaged Spitfires withdrew from combat, and another Hurricane sustained minor ‘injuries’. In other engagements that day, the Germans lost seven more aircraft, while the British had no losses.

Over the next few days, Luftwaffe aircraft operated against naval convoys and carried out raids on coastal targets. Fighter groups engaged in ‘free hunting’ in search of opportunistic targets. The British soon learned to leave the latter alone—long flights exhausted the Germans, and there was a shortage of spare parts and fuel, an inevitable factor when operating from makeshift airfields.

By July 16, the number of operational aircraft in Hannes Trautloft’s III/JG 51 had shrunk to fifteen machines, i.e., 40% of its nominal strength. Other German fighter units were in a similar situation. Only by the end of the month did reinforcements arrive in the form of several fresh squadrons.

Oberleutnant Hans Schmommer-Haldi, a Bf 109 pilot with JG 54, recalled: ‘Our job was to provide close escort, which I personally hated. It gave the bomber crews a sense of security and perhaps deterred some enemy pilots. But for us, fighter pilots, such a mission was of little interest. We wanted the advantage of altitude and speed to engage the enemy under favorable conditions. In this situation, the initiative belonged to the British, and they decided when and how to attack. We had to maintain speed, otherwise, when attacked by Spitfires, our Messerschmitt Bf 109Es took too long to gain it’.

Two Fighter Command squadrons were equipped with Bolton-Paul Defiant aircraft. These unusual-looking single-engine interceptors were armed with a revolving machine-gun turret but had no fixed forward-firing weapons. The Defiants achieved some success only at Dunkirk, when the Germans, mistaking them for Hurricanes, attacked them from behind, one after another exposing themselves to the turret’s fire. However, German pilots soon understood what this ‘bird’ was—a clumsy aircraft, slow and unwieldy like a turkey—and did not repeat their earlier mistake.

They got a chance for revenge on July 19, when Trautloft’s ‘falcons’ spotted twelve Defiants near Dover. After the Luftwaffe aces approached from the sun, attacks followed from below and behind, against which the British two-seater aircraft were defenseless. Six Defiants were shot down, and one was severely damaged. Only the belated intervention of a Hurricane squadron prevented a total massacre. All Messerschmitts returned safely to base, though some with bullet holes: the next day, only eleven machines were fit for flight. On July 19 alone, the British Air Force lost ten aircraft at the cost of four German. The day when the Germans would achieve air superiority seemed not far off.

The 26th Fighter Wing ‘Schlageter’, with the formidable Adolf Galland leading Group III, participated in combat operations on July 24. Galland’s first task was to escort bombers during a raid on an Allied convoy in the Thames Estuary. Circling high above the heavy machines, Galland noticed a group of Spitfires from RAF 54 Squadron rapidly catching up to them.

Diving down from an ‘eagle’s flight’ height, he immediately shot down one of the British fighters. A fierce battle ensued with the remaining five, and the British partly owed their lives to the fact that the Germans acted individually, each in their own way. Subsequently, a group of Spitfires from RAF 65 Squadron joined the fray. As often happened, there was much maneuvering and firing in the aerial battle, but few positive results. The duels lasted long, and the fighters’ fuel was running low; soon, the Messerschmitts, whose bases were significantly further away than the British, began to leave the battlefield one after another, departing with a half-roll into a dive. Engines running at full power left trails of smoke.

This misled many English pilots, who assumed that the German aircraft were falling with damaged engines. But in fact, only two Messerschmitts were actually shot down, and two Spitfires as well, one of which was landed by its wounded pilot. Thus, Adolf Galland—a man many consider the greatest ace of the past war—re-entered combat.

Four days later, Werner Mölders also returned to service, though his return was less successful. Appointed commander of JG 51 that morning, replacing Theo Osterkamp, at noon he led units from Groups I and II/JG 51 that had taken off to escort a bomber formation. In the Dover area, they clashed with Spitfires from the British 74th Squadron; the English aircraft were led by a pilot universally nicknamed ‘the British Mölders’—Adolf Malan, alias ‘Sailor’. A real battle erupted, during which Mölders’ aircraft was severely damaged, and the pilot himself was wounded in the leg, which subsequently sidelined him for several weeks.

It’s possible that Mölders’ victor was indeed Malan, but as Richard Leppla from 1/JG 51 (who later had 68 enemy aircraft shot down to his credit) claimed, he immediately ‘downed’ the fighter that attacked Mölders—thus, Malan’s victory is doubtful. During the battle, the Germans destroyed two Spitfires, but one of the English pilots managed to escape. The Luftwaffe’s irrecoverable losses amounted to four aircraft, including Mölders’ fighter (it had to be written off after a belly landing). Two more aircraft were damaged, and one of them made a forced landing.

Max-Helmut Ostermann, I1I/JG 54 on escort, recounted: ‘From below, we saw the bright blue bellies of the English aircraft. Mostly they waited until our bombers started to turn. Then they would swoop down, fire on exit from the dive, and all pull away together. All we could do was fire back childishly, while making sure none of the enemy aircraft got on our tail. Very often, one of us would push the stick back like mad until the ailerons shook, but a quick turn was still impossible. All that remained was to watch… there, the English had already shot down one of our bombers, and it, listing, began to fall’.

In the first period of the Battle of Britain, the Germans noted the ability of British fighters to appear at the moment and place they were least expected. By tracking Fighter Command’s radio communications, the effectiveness of the exceptionally advanced British air warning, observation, and communication system was revealed. But in Germany, they did not yet know all its capabilities. This was to be learned in the next stage of the battle.

The decisive assault, which, according to German plans, was intended to cripple British Fighter Command, was scheduled for August 10, but had to be postponed due to bad weather. However, on August 11, fierce battles erupted in the skies over England. After fighter raids into southern Britain, a massive German air attack on the naval base at Portland followed. Seven squadrons of the Royal Air Force were scrambled to intercept 75 Luftwaffe bombers, which were escorted by 61 Messerschmitt Bf 110s from I and II/JG 2, and 30 Bf 109s from III/JG 2.

The Bf 110s immediately formed an enormous defensive circle, but this time it proved largely ineffective. Arriving Spitfires opened fire with significant lead on the Messerschmitts at the far end of the circle. In the very first attack, five Bf 110s were shot down. When the defensive circle broke, the remaining Bf 110s mingled in the general melee of fighters; another one was destroyed and five others sustained damage.

Besieged from all sides, German fighters desperately tried to drive off the furiously attacking Spitfires and Hurricanes from their bombers, but achieved only partial success, despite the fact that JG 27 aircraft were sent to their aid on the way back. The British shot down another six bombers and seven Messerschmitt-109s—the total Luftwaffe losses in this battle amounted to 19 machines. However, the price of the RAF victory was also quite high—16 Hurricanes destroyed and one Spitfire.

A new phase of the battle, called ‘Adlerangriff’ (‘Eagle Attack’) by the Germans, essentially began on August 12, when a group of fighter-bombers from ErprGr 210 struck English coastal radar stations. This was followed by a raid on the Ventnor radar station. At noon the same day, British airfields were bombed for the first time.

After repairs, the radar stations soon returned to service, with the exception of Ventnor, whose loss was not publicized, and the resulting gap was ‘patched’ with a mobile radar unit. From this point on, the Germans left the radar stations alone, as the Luftwaffe high command considered them too difficult a target. No pinpoint strikes were made against sector command posts, although these were precisely the most vulnerable. This was a major mistake, as it greatly reduced the chances of catching British fighter squadrons on the ground. German fighter pilots looked to the future with optimism. To wear down the enemy’s forces in the air, they encouraged their desire to take off and engage in battle.

The ‘Adler Tag’ (‘Eagle Day’), which had begun in the meantime, caused widespread tension, somewhat relieved by bad weather. On this day, 9 Messerschmitt Bf 109s and 18 Bf 110s were shot down or made forced landings. In addition, the Luftwaffe lost twenty bombers. The British lost thirteen fighters, i.e., much fewer than the Germans, but the exaggeration of air victories—an inherent feature of air warfare—hid this unpleasant truth from German pilots.

Bad weather also impacted combat activity on August 14, but in the following few days, the Germans undertook massive air attacks, directed primarily against English military airfields. However, the effect of the raids did not meet expectations. Intelligence provided information about active British airfields but failed to provide data on the types of aircraft based there. As a result, German aviation wasted considerable effort attacking bases that did not house Fighter Command aircraft.

In the fierce battles, the number of victories for Luftwaffe experts grew. Galland scored his twentieth victory on August 15; Walter Oesau (III/JG51) and Horst Tietzen (II/JG 51) had slightly fewer, although the latter ace was shot down and killed on the 18th in a clash with Hurricanes in the Whitstable area. Werner Mölders returned to duty and, after ten fruitless sorties, finally achieved his 27th air victory: on August 26, he shot down a Spitfire. Two days later, he managed to destroy a Hurricane and, surprisingly, a Hawk 75, although this type of aircraft was not in RAF service. The trio of Hurricanes shot down by Mölders on the last day of the month put him in the lead, surpassing Balthasar. However, he had little to worry about: Balthasar was seriously wounded on September 4 in a duel over Canterbury with Spitfires and, with 31 enemy aircraft shot down, was put out of the battle.

German bomber losses in the first six days of Operation ‘Adlerangriff’ amounted to 125 machines. Among them were 43 Ju 87 Stukas—an aircraft highly vulnerable to the enemy, which after the terrible carnage of August 18 was no longer used in battles over Britain. The escort fighters fought fiercely, evidenced by 56 lost Messerschmitt Bf 109s and 63 Bf 110s.

British fighter aviation lost fewer than 100 aircraft during the same period, although the constant exaggeration of shot-down aircraft misled Luftwaffe pilots, creating the illusion of a much larger number of defeated enemies. On the other hand, the unpleasant truth was that, on average, the Luftwaffe lost 49 aircraft per day, which was completely unacceptable (only on August 17, due to unflyable weather, neither side suffered losses).

Complaints from German bomber crews about insufficient fighter support forced the command to order closer interaction between most escort fighters and bomber formations to prevent their interception. An additional measure taken during this period was the replacement of several fighter unit commanders with young and successful pilots. Adolf Galland was one of the first to benefit from this decision, advancing in rank and taking command of the 26th Fighter Wing. Gerhard Schöpfel succeeded him as commander of III/JG 26, and Heinz Ebeling took command of 9./JG 26. Other newly appointed wing commanders included Günther Lützow (JG 3), Hans Trübenbach (JG 52), and Hannes Trautloft (JG 54).

The introduction of new leaders almost immediately affected the course of combat operations. Although Luftwaffe fighter pilots did not particularly enjoy flying as bomber escorts, explaining with good reason that their advantage in speed, altitude, and surprise was lost, nevertheless, over the last two weeks, German aviation losses amounted to 21 aircraft per day—i.e., a 60% reduction. Bombers and Bf 110 fighters benefited most from this; average losses of single-seat fighters remained at 11 machines per day! The average loss rate for British fighters did not change: 19 aircraft per day.

Werner Mölders proved to be the successor of Oswald Boelcke, a World War I ace dubbed the ‘father of air combat’. Galland, in turn, considered himself the Richthofen of World War II, as both worked intensively on improving fighter aviation tactics. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 was still inferior in horizontal engagements to the more maneuverable Spitfires and Hurricanes. In this regard, only one possible solution presented itself: to fight in the vertical, having an advantage in altitude to dive, open fire, and then, with the accumulated speed, climb back up.

But often the situation did not allow for such a fighting method: Galland twice noticed Spitfires on his tail from which he could not break away. In such cases, he would simply start firing into the sky. The smoke from the shots and, possibly, the impact of spent casings on the fuselages of pursuing aircraft led enemy pilots to believe they were encountering a fighter with a rear gun position. As a result, the chase would cease.

Fase 3: September 7-30

By early September, it became increasingly evident that Fighter Command had managed to avoid defeat, and the Germans had failed to destroy a significant number of their aircraft on the ground. The plan of raids on military airfields had failed, and a new objective arose: London! Naturally, it was expected that the British would throw almost all available fighters into the defense of their capital. To create numerical superiority in the upcoming battles for London, fighter units of the 3rd Air Fleet were urgently transferred to Pas-de-Calais.

At noon on September 7, an armada of 350 German bombers, escorted by over 600 fighters, set course for the capital of the British Empire. This change of targets was a complete surprise to the defenders, who were poorly prepared for resistance. The aircraft broke through to London and subjected the dock area to a massive bombardment. Luftwaffe losses amounted to only about 10 bombers and 22 fighters. The Royal Air Force lost 29 machines. On September 11, London was again subjected to another raid by German aviation, then a relative calm set in for several days. Fighter Command had performed very poorly since early September. The Germans even began to mock the British, claiming that ‘only the last 50 Spitfires’ remained in Britain. It seemed that their words were not far from the truth.

On September 15, German air force attacks resumed with renewed vigor. Approximately 150 Messerschmitt Bf 109s from various air units headed towards London. In the center of the formation flew the ‘bait’—25 Dornier bombers from I and III/KG 76. For its part, Fighter Command scraped together 23 squadrons, and the fighter duel began. The first clashes erupted near Maidstone and continued along the aircraft’s entire route to the suburbs of the English capital. Despite all efforts by German fighters to protect their bombers, the British pressure did not subside. Soon, having exhausted their fuel limit, the Messerschmitts began to withdraw from the battle one after another, leaving the bombers without cover. A distinguishing feature of aerial combat is that the more aircraft participate in it, the smaller the percentage of enemy machines put out of action.

This also happened here, where losses were equally divided: nine Bf 109s against an analogous number of British fighters. In addition, two Hurricanes were destroyed in a clash with German bombers, one of which was due to a collision. The price was high—six Dorniers were shot down, and two were so severely damaged that they could not be repaired. Around noon, a second formation flew out, following the first. This time, the ‘bait’ was even larger—144 bombers from four different bomber wings. The escort was mighty—361 fighters! As before, British aircraft took to the air, and the battle resumed, continuing, as the armada moved, from the coast all the way to London.

Fire was delivered quickly and haphazardly: it seemed unwise to spend more than a few seconds on an opponent when there were so many fighters around, one of whom could always get on the attacker’s tail. Surprise was the predominant factor for success in battle, and maneuvering rarely led to positive results. Adolf Galland, who led JG 26 that day, later recalled his 33rd aerial victory: ‘After an unsuccessful fight with eight Hurricanes, during which we largely lost our former altitude advantage,’ Galland recalled, ‘I, along with a staff flight of fighters, attacked two Hurricanes flying approximately 800 meters below us. Unseen, I closed in on the wingman, opening fire at 120 meters as the Englishman attempted a shallow left turn. The enemy aircraft shuddered as the tracers from my cannons and machine guns struck it, and a shower of fragments flew from the left wing and fuselage. Then the entire left side of the aircraft was engulfed in flames’.

The situation where combat against experienced enemy pilots proved unsuccessful even for aces like Galland was quite typical. A sudden attack yielded a much greater effect. Although Galland initiated it with a significant altitude advantage, what was important was that it concluded in the enemy’s blind spot. Finally, the firing distance chosen was very short—120 meters: much more often, fighter pilots opened fire from 300 meters or more. Galland himself sometimes closed in so tightly with enemy aircraft that he called it ‘ramming distance’.

Fierce aerial clashes between English and German machines continued all the way to London; then the tide of battle turned in the opposite direction—towards the coast, where a peculiar ‘reception committee’ of 50 Messerschmitt Bf 109s met the bombers and escort fighters returning from the raid. And the English continued to throw fresh squadrons into the battle! That afternoon, they lost 15 fighters, while Luftwaffe losses amounted to 21 bombers and at least 12 fighters.

September 15 proved to be an unfavorable day for German pilots, clearly demonstrating that the Luftwaffe was nowhere near dominating the English Air Force. Moreover, despite weeks and months of heavy fighting, the enemy seemed stronger than ever. The German command had to postpone the landing on the British Isles indefinitely. Night bombings gained increasing importance, and after heavy losses on September 27 and 30, massive daytime raids on London were completely halted.

Fase 4: October 1 – December 31

Experimental Group 210 had used Bf 109 and Bf 110 aircraft as fighter-bombers since July, and not without success. Encouraged by this state of affairs, Reichsmarschall of Aviation Göring ordered in early September the re-equipment of one-third of the allocated fighters as fighter-bombers (abbreviated in German as Jabo). In the next raid on London on September 15, 21 Messerschmitt Bf 109s from II/LG 2 participated in their new role, but their role in this raid was insignificant.

The fast and high-flying Jabos were not easy for the enemy to intercept. However, most German pilots did not approve of the command’s decision to reassign them to what they considered a lower category of ‘bomb-haulers’. Being less qualified than the specialists from ErpGr 210, they achieved little. Their fighter colleagues continued to battle the British for air superiority, but the scale of the fighting diminished considerably. With the onset of autumn and cold weather, rain and snow not only limited flying possibilities but also turned Luftwaffe field airfields into muddy areas. By the end of 1940, it became clear to the Germans that they had suffered a defeat, although this evidence did not become immediately apparent but only after some time had passed.