Historical Context and Conflict Origins
Congo, past and present, is a dark and fearful place where witchcraft, cannibalism, and ritual killings are still practiced in its primal jungles. In the 19th century, Joseph Conrad described his ‘journey to the very beginning of the world, when the earth was covered with lush vegetation and big trees were kings. A dried-up stream, complete silence, an impenetrable forest’. This is the deepest, darkest Africa; this is Congo.
The history of Congo’s civil wars in the 1960s is highly convoluted and contradictory. Very often, former allies became irreconcilable enemies and vice versa. Researchers identify three more or less distinct conflicts: the secession of Katanga (1960-63), the Simba rebellion (1964-66), and the mercenary revolt of 1967. This work will focus on the participation of aviation in the events of 1964-67.
Briefly recalling the preceding events, after Congo gained independence from the Belgian crown on June 30, 1960, the country found itself in chaos due to civil war and inter-tribal clashes. The most serious issue was the attempt by the southernmost (and richest) province of Katanga to secede. Moise Tshombe led the rebellion there, relying on white mercenaries in his fight against the central government. Only UN military intervention saved the Kasavubu government from fiasco.
When the UN J-29s returned home in August 1963, not a single combat aircraft remained in Congo. The government Air Force was represented only by a few outdated aircraft. In January 1964, a rebellion erupted in the Kwilu River basin near Kikwit in the southwest of the country, led by Peter Mulele, who had received guerrilla warfare training in China. The Congolese Army (ANC) was unable to halt the advance of the rebels, who captured one city after another.
The Simba Rebellion and Foreign Intervention
The United States, concerned about such an unfavorable development in a strategically important region of the world, decided to provide assistance. The omnipotent CIA directly undertook its implementation, deciding first and foremost to “reanimate” the government Air Force. However, specialists who soon arrived in the country found only a few serviceable T-6 Texans training aircraft, supplied to the Congolese government by Italy during the Tshombe revolt.
Among other things, the Air Force listed several aircraft (all unairworthy) acquired as trophies after the defeat of the Tshombe rebellion: two Doves, a DC-3, a Heron, and a Magister. The Americans immediately began rearming the Harvards. As a result, these small training aircraft gained the ability to carry eight unguided rockets and four French-made machine guns each.
The question of flight personnel was much more acute: American citizens could not directly participate in combat operations in other countries, and there was a very high probability of communist bloc countries being drawn into the conflict. A “Solomonic solution” was then adopted: all flight positions were filled by Cubans residing in the US. All these pilots had rich combat experience, having participated in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.
The situation demanded prompt action, and the first Cubans appeared on African soil by April 1964. Soon, a unit was formed, commanded by Joaquin Varela (who had commanded a B-26 squadron during the Bay of Pigs invasion). The Cubans agreed to participate in this adventure for three main reasons: firstly, by fighting here, they firmly believed they were continuing their struggle against communism, albeit in a different guise; secondly, the CIA always paid well (initially $800 a month); and finally, as one pilot put it, “I’d rather fly than operate a lawnmower in some Miami hotel.”
Over time, the scale of hostilities increased, leading to a significant increase in the number of American pilots. It should be noted that not only Cubans flew in Congo: a large number of Belgian “advisers” favored Dakotas and helicopters. During this period, the situation radically complicated – another rebellion erupted in the eastern provinces. Faced with the threat of losing power, Kasavubu took extraordinary measures: he invited the exiled Tshombe to become prime minister!
To boost the morale of his “army,” Mulele declared them “lions” (or simba in the local dialect). Such a phenomenon could only occur in Congo. Witch doctors performed rituals with magical concoctions on recruits, most of whom had only recently emerged from the bush, which were supposed to make the rebels invulnerable to bullets. The warriors were only required to wave a palm branch and repeat a simple spell, allegedly turning bullets into water. Of course, if a Simba died in battle, it was exclusively because he had not followed the witch doctor’s instructions. Since then, an entire period in the history of this African country has been named the “Simba rebellion.”
Socialist countries provided enormous support to the Simba. An “air bridge” was organized to the eastern regions, through which weapons and ammunition flowed continuously. Algerian An-12s and Ghanaian Il-18s, using Brazzaville (former French Congo) as a transit point, made several hundred flights. Simultaneously, Egyptian An-12s flew to Kivu via Sudanese airfields.
Perhaps for the first time in military history, there was a sharp leap in armament: the Simba transitioned from spears and machetes to Kalashnikov assault rifles! On August 4, the commander of the Simba forces, “Lieutenant General” Nicolas Olenga, captured Stanleyville in northern Congo. This was quite easy, as the Congolese army fighters were just as disorganized, but dressed in uniforms. Soldiers fled in terror upon seeing the “magically protected” Simba.
Many whites (including the entire American consulate there) fell into the hands of the rebels. Mulele decided to use them as “human shields,” and this became his fatal mistake. In response to these overtly hostile actions, the American government (after concluding a secret agreement with Belgium) decided to provide larger-scale military aid to the government in its war with the Simba.
As an emergency, high-level measure, the deployment of 10 USAF B-26K bombers was authorized (interestingly, according to documents, the aircraft did not fly anywhere and remained at a storage base for their entire time in Congo). On August 13, regular pilots of the 602nd Fighter Squadron ferried the aircraft across the ocean from the Van Nuys factory airfield via Dutch Guiana-Brazil-Ascension Island-Leopoldville. The pilots were unaware of the situation at the landing area and assumed the worst.
However, they were met on the ground by American commandos who had been deployed there a few days earlier. Several UH-1B Iroquois helicopters were also present. After transferring the aircraft to the Cubans, American personnel left the country. Among other things, a significant reinforcement of the mercenary aviation corps in Congo was planned. In a short time, the number of Cuban pilots increased to 25. New weaponry was also being procured.
It was decided to send B-26 light bombers, which had already proven effective in counter-guerrilla operations worldwide, to Congo. In addition to the brand-new B-26Ks, CIA agents were able to find four “unclaimed” B-26Bs at Clark Air Base (Philippines), which were then transferred for the needs of the organization’s African department. These bombers, however, were already “advanced in age”: they had previously been used by French pilots in Indochina and also involved in CIA operations in Indonesia and the Bay of Pigs.
Nevertheless, even such aircraft were needed in Africa: they were ferried for “cosmetic” repairs to Okinawa. Here, one aircraft was rejected, and only three aircraft embarked on the long journey. Upon arrival, one B-26 was used for reconnaissance flights, and when rebels approached, it was converted into a primitive transport for evacuating technical personnel. The B-26Ks first proved themselves on August 21, when a pair of such machines attacked rebel positions.
On August 29-30, largely thanks to air support, government troops were able to capture Albertville – a major city on Lake Tanganyika. The attack aircraft made such an impression on the commander of the government unit storming the city that when the pilots landed their machines at the captured airfield, he declared the aircraft confiscated to support his personal combat operations! The American pilots had to wait a couple of days until, taking advantage of a lapse in security, they were able to fly back to the squadron base.
Initially, aircraft operations were in the hands of Cuban mechanics. But the sharp increase in equipment required an increase in mechanics, and since there were simply no locals, mercenary services were again resorted to. To recruit specialists, the CIA organized the “Western International Ground Maintenance Organisation” (WIGMO) campaign, registered in Liechtenstein. This campaign concluded an official agreement with the Congolese government for the maintenance of Air Force aircraft, and its personnel were in the country on a completely legal basis.
There was no shortage of applicants, and soon British mechanics and Poles residing in the UK were recruited for the CIA’s needs in Congo. Subsequently, a large group of Swedes, several Germans, and one Finn, one Dane, one Swede, and one Spaniard also signed the contract. German and Polish mechanics received high praise for their work from the Cuban pilots, but the services of British armourers had to be abandoned after several weapon failures.
The first Cuban pilots had contracts not with WIGMO, but with the “Caribbean Marine Aero Corporation,” registered in the US. All CIA aircraft in Congo were nominally part of the Congolese Air Force. The squadron was designated 22 Escadrille, 2 Groupement, Force Aurienne Congolaise. The Cuban pilots preferred to call themselves “El Grupo Voluntario Cubano” (The Cuban Volunteer Group), in the style of the American Volunteer Group in 1941-42 in China.
In practice, however, all sorties were coordinated with the CIA resident in the country and the American ambassador. In rare cases, a USAF officer seconded to the embassy would conduct briefings using photo maps. In most cases, the adviser to the Commander of the Congolese Air Force, Belgian Emile Boujin (who had previously commanded the Belgian Air Force contingent in that colony), would simply point to enemy-held villages on a map and issue something like “fly and shoot them all.”
Like the T-28s, the B-26s initially performed similar tasks, but soon the Invaders began to be used as “long-range bombers,” while T-28s, scattered across field airfields, were used as attack aircraft for direct ground troop support. To increase flight range, additional fuel tanks were installed in the B-26 bomb bays, so the primary armament became unguided rockets and small arms.
Mainly, the Cubans flew free-hunt missions over enemy-occupied territory. Anything that moved was attacked. Preference was given to attacking railway convoys, with pilots aiming not to hit the locomotive itself (because it was hard to repair after the rebels scattered into the jungle). The Simba also used equipment very uniquely – as soon as fuel ran out, it was abandoned, be it a steam locomotive or a car.
There were, however, some unfortunate incidents, most often occurring when government army soldiers found themselves in enemy territory. For instance, one day a pair of B-26s encountered a railway convoy in a free-hunt area. After receiving the “all clear” from the ground, the Cubans attacked. Further investigations revealed that these were government troops. It turned out the soldiers had captured the train from the Simba and were advancing on it towards the front line.
Due to the Simba’s lack of anti-aircraft weapons, the pilots felt completely safe on their sorties. They used only unguided rockets and small arms. At the same time, rebel losses from air raids were very heavy, and the enormous psychological impact cannot be overstated. On the other hand, had the Simba been better prepared, they could have long since dealt with the government Air Force. The Congolese knew airport security only by hearsay, and destroying aircraft on the ground would have been no trouble for a small, trained unit.
Moreover, the Cuban pilots gathered every evening at the same drinking establishment, which they called “The Pizzeria,” and one or two grenades through the window would have put a definitive end to the history of the Congolese Air Force! During major operations, B-26Ks were used alongside T-28s to support ground troops. This first occurred in early September 1964, when the Simba launched an offensive on Boende, a major city on the Congo River. A pair of Invaders was then deployed for reinforcement.
René García, one of the Cubans, recalled these flights: “From the airport, Boujin could clearly see a large barge on which the rebels were crossing from one bank of the river to the other. I turned to get a closer look. There were about a dozen rebels and a figure in white on the barge. I descended lower and saw that it was a priest. Priests in Congo actually wear cream-colored clothing, but from my altitude, the cassock seemed white to me. I reported the situation to the colonel and he replied: ‘Attack, but try not to hit the priest’. I replied: ‘I have eight guns and I’m not on a shooting range!'”
“Apparently, the priest had been captured and was being used as a hostage. However, someone had to do their job, and I, aiming away from the priest, pressed the trigger. As I turned, I saw that three enemies had fallen, but several more and the priest were standing. This priest, after this incident, will probably thank God every day for his miraculous salvation! As I remember, the priest was not killed by the Simba. Soon I heard the colonel’s shouts ‘Shoot! Shoot!’ (he was always laconic on air). Another guy and I made a carousel, firing machine guns at trucks along the river. Destroying vehicles was a more important task than destroying personnel. We fired, but no truck exploded. We just didn’t see how they exploded.
Soon, only two groups of people remained on the road, shooting at us. Sixteen heavy machine guns left them no chance. They probably believed Mulele that they were invulnerable to enemy bullets. We shot almost everyone; a few survived only because we were already sick of killing.”
After expending ammunition, the Invaders returned to Leopoldville. Despite numerous losses, the Simba still took Boende. Because there were very few aircraft in Congo, they were versatile. Thus, B-26s, in addition to assault attacks, were used for reconnaissance and search operations. Michael Hoare, in his memoirs “Congo Warriors,” recalls an episode where rescue equipment was dropped from a B-26 to survivors of a shipwreck on Lake Tanganyika.
On another occasion, a pair of Invaders was called upon to search for a South African who went missing on January 18, 1966, in a Harvard. The only strike unit of the Congolese Air Force not subordinate to the CIA was for a long time a T-6 squadron, piloted by Cubans. However, after receiving more modern T-28s, the old Harvards were handed over to the Congolese.
Tshombe, however, was more accustomed to trusting mercenaries (and there were simply no local personnel), and in late July 1964, he recruited his own team. These were mostly South Africans, although pilots of other nationalities were also encountered. Technical personnel were airlifted by South African Air Force Hercules transports to Stanleyville airfield shortly after the start of active hostilities. On October 3, 1964, the creation of the 21 Escadrille, Force Aurienne Congolaise, was officially announced, led by the South African Captain Jimmy Hedges.
His flying career is remarkable: he began service in the RAF, then continued in the South African Air Force, and with the start of the Tshombe rebellion, he went to Congo. The same could be said of almost everyone. The squadron’s base was designated as Ndolo airfield (familiar to many from the Katanga events) near Leopoldville. The old Harvards had to participate quite actively in combat operations. In November, a quartet was in the Boende area, and the other three in Kindu. In addition to these seven attack aircraft, an unarmed old T-6 (from colonial times) remained at the base for maintaining flying skills. However, the Americans disliked the presence of an “independent” Congolese Air Force, and under threat of withdrawing the B-26s, Tshombe was eventually forced to disband this unit.
The War’s Conclusion and Legacy
Meanwhile, events unfolded with alarming speed. By the end of September, the Simba controlled about half of the country’s territory. The position of the Congolese government became critical. Belgian Colonel Frédéric Vandewalle urgently took command of all government army operations, with the primary task of freeing white hostages in Stanleyville.
The operation, developed by Belgian General Staff officers, was called “L’Ommegang” and involved a swift breakthrough by two motorized columns of the Congolese army, supported by mercenaries (code-named “Lima-1” and “Lima-2”), deep into Simba-controlled territory, and the storming of the city. “Lima-1” departed Kongolo on November 1 and reached Kindu four days later, where, according to the plan, it was supposed to link up with “Lima-2”. But it was not until November 18 that the troops crossed the Congo east of Kindu, 480 km from Stanleyville.
Throughout the march, government troops were supported by T-28s and B-26s. Pilots maintained VHF communication with ground troops, using the code designations “Bravo” and “Tango”. One B-26K performed a reconnaissance flight every morning ahead of the column’s route. Another similar aircraft was always on standby at Baka airfield. The Congolese tried to move without excessive noise to avoid provoking the rebels into retaliating against the hostages. However, the situation for the whites worsened daily (several people were executed), and then a joint parachute assault operation, named “Dragon Rouge” (Red Dragon), was urgently developed and carried out.
The operation was conducted in two stages. During the first, 12 USAF C-130E military transport aircraft airlifted 545 Belgian paratroopers along the route Klein Brogel-Ascension Island-Kamina (with unprecedented secrecy measures). The second stage involved the flight from Kamina airfield, under B-26 cover, to Stanleyville and the drop of paratroopers. The attack began on November 24 at 06:00, when a pair of B-26Ks flew over Stanleyville airport, and 60 seconds later, paratroopers rained down onto the airfield.
The Simba offered no resistance (only three paratroopers died during the operation), and soon all surviving hostages were liberated. However, for 29 people, it was already too late. Congolese troops entered the city five hours after the end of “Red Dragon”. A few more hours later, British and Belgian transports evacuated about two thousand people. The British evacuated 143 people. It was noted that during the flights, the aircraft were actively fired upon from the ground. There were losses: on November 29, a DC-4 airliner chartered by the UN from a Belgian company crashed on takeoff.
Two days later, the Belgians conducted a similar operation, “Dragon Noire” (Black Dragon), in Paulis, where approximately two hundred hostages were held. Again, a pair of B-26s covered the C-130s. After the liberation of most hostages, fearing an international scandal, American aircraft and Belgian paratroopers left the country. The Simba made several unsuccessful attempts to retake Stanleyville. It should be noted that by that point, three mercenary units were operating in the country, possessing a certain independence in combat operations and playing a major role in the unfolding events.
South African Major Michael Hoare formed the English-speaking 5 Commando, which operated in the northeast of the country. French paratrooper Bob Denard, at the head of the Franco-Belgian 6 Commando, operated on the border with Central Africa, and former Belgian planter Jacques Schramme with 10 Commando favored the eastern regions. The aerial power of the “government Air Force” was constantly increasing; in January 1965, two more Invaders arrived, and the number of T-28s simultaneously increased. At that time, Stanleyville airfield became the main base for the government Air Force.
From here, the B-26s operated on a “shift” basis, “plugging gaps” across the country. In late March 1965, Michael Hoare liberated the city of Watsa from the Simba. The rebels finally lost the initiative. In the March battles, mercenaries pursued the Simba even across borders: the Ugandan government protested against Congolese aircraft striking villages on the border. One group of aircraft also mistakenly struck Sudanese territory. The last major operation in this region was the liberation of Bondo and Buta in early June.
At the same time, the Simba began to receive significant aid from the Chinese through their embassy in Burundi, thus significantly strengthening their positions along Lake Tanganyika. However, the mercenaries, with active air support, soon launched an offensive in this region as well. By October 10, 1965, Hoare declared that the Fizi-Baraka area had been liberated from the rebels. In the fighting, the mercenaries were supported by 12 T-28s and several helicopters, based at Albertville airfield.
After this, only small Simba units offered resistance, which the government army dealt with. Tshombe (under whose banners the European mercenaries had gathered) was no longer needed and was once again sent into exile on November 5. And on November 25, 1965, as a result of a military coup, the commander of the Congolese army, General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, ousted Kasavubu and declared himself president.
The defeat of the Simba and the redistribution of power significantly reduced the intensity of the war, and the CIA began gradually withdrawing its aviation units from the country. The first B-26K returned to the US in October 1966, followed by the four remaining ones. By late March 1967, no aircraft of this modification remained in the country. The B-26Bs became completely unusable and were abandoned at Leopoldville airfield in late 1966 or early 1967.
In late 1968, reports appeared in the press that two Nigerian pilots had arrived in Kinshasa (as Leopoldville was then renamed) to try to reactivate the abandoned aircraft. However, their efforts apparently came to naught. Most CIA pilots left the country in spring 1967. However, instead of American pilots, pilots of other nationalities made several sorties – two Colombians, one Englishman, one South African, and one Swede. The B-26s in Congo flew using all available resources. According to one Cuban, he flew 3000 hours in two and a half years. Of the B-26Ks that served in Congo, four were subsequently actively used in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, no serious crashes were registered during the entire war period. The only major incident was an accident in September 1965, when a pilot broke the landing gear on landing. Based on the aircraft’s operation in Africa, American engineers developed a series of recommendations on B-26 application methods in hot and humid climates.
The T-28s were transferred to the Congolese Air Force in 1967, but Cuban mercenaries continued to fly transport aircraft until late 1969. WIGMO remained on paper for a few more years. The situation in Congo meanwhile became increasingly convoluted. Mobutu hastened to announce the disbandment of all mercenary units, but Schramme independently remained and, with his detachment, organized a kind of “state” based on the slave labor of captured Simba.
In June 1967, Belgian and French mercenaries led by Denard attempted to seize power in Katanga and Kivu provinces. Initially, they were successful: on August 9, 1500 Katangan gendarmes and 160 mercenaries captured the main city of Kivu province, Bukavu. However, local residents offered no support, and soon government troops were urgently airlifted there (aboard USAF Hercules transports). And after government troops shot 30 captured fighters of Bob Denard, the morale of the mercenaries plummeted further – mass desertion began. The wounded, along with Denard, were airlifted in a Dakota to neighboring Rhodesia, from where Schramme hoped a “second front” would be opened.
Schramme’s own situation became critical: there was no airstrip in Bukavu, so supplies could only be parachuted to him, which naturally could not cover his needs. Furthermore, the Congolese army in the war with the mercenaries relied on aviation. On October 28, the decisive battle for Bukavu began: the government army was by then well-trained by Israeli instructors, and the mercenaries were exhausted by years of war.
Part of the forces was drawn off by the remnants of 6 Commando, who launched an offensive into Katanga from Angola on November 1, but without air support, they were forced to retreat three days later. The remnants of Schramme’s unit began to infiltrate neighboring Rwanda, where they were immediately placed in displaced persons camps. Only on April 23, 1968, a pair of DC-6s, chartered by the International Red Cross, airlifted 115 white mercenaries to Europe. Another 600 Katangan gendarmes, at Mobutu’s request, were returned to their homeland by the Rwandan government, after which nothing more was heard of them.
Thus ended another tragic period in the troubled history of black Africa’s largest country. Ahead were the years of Mobutu’s rule….