Africa has long been “famous” for its constant wars. It might seem that for the “dark continent,” inter-tribal slaughter is a common, traditional affair, uninteresting to anyone except those directly involved. However, in the 1980s, the attention of several superpowers was drawn to the bloody events in Chad, one of the poorest countries in the region, even against a generally bleak backdrop.
Chad, like other countries of French Equatorial Africa, gained independence on August 11, 1960. Colonial authorities transferred full power to the local government of François Tombalbaye. Whether by chance or design, all ministers of this government were Christians.
Initial French Intervention and Internal Fragmentation
It is worth noting that Chad’s territory is clearly divided into two large regions: the Christian, wealthy south, inhabited by farmers, and the Muslim, poor north, populated by nomadic Arab and Berber tribes. The relative prosperity of the southerners generated envy among the impoverished nomads. Moreover, the situation was aggravated by religious contradictions.
Thus, the central government held on only thanks to French bayonets, with Foreign Legion units stationed there “to maintain order.” However, in 1964, under pressure from the international community, France withdrew its troops. The Chadian army, whose officer corps was almost exclusively composed of southerners, took their place.
Attempts to suppress Muslim discontent by force met with growing resistance. In 1966, the “Chadian Liberation Front” emerged, declaring war on the central government. At this stage, the rebels enjoyed Algeria’s support. The government army’s affairs were not going well, and after a couple of years, French army units returned to Chad, supporting the friendly regime. In August 1968, four A-1H “Skyraider” attack aircraft from the EAA (Escadron d’Appui Aerien) 1/21 Armee d’Air squadron flew from Djibouti to Fort-Lamy airfield in Chad.
On March 1, 1969, Squadron EAA 1/22 was formed from these aircraft. Operating from Fort-Lamy airfield, the “Skyraiders” struck rebel positions. From July, the French military’s actions were supported by Air Group Groupe de Marche du Tchad 59, which included “Noratlases,” “Alouettes,” and “Broussards.” A helicopter unit, Detachment Permanent d’Helicopteres 02\67, with H-34 helicopters—well-proven in the Algerian war—also provided support. French pilots felt completely safe, as the rebels had no anti-aircraft weaponry yet.
Libyan Escalation and the Battle for N’Djamena
Around the same time, in September 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power in Libya. He enthusiastically supported “brothers in faith” and ideology, while simultaneously pursuing his own goals, as Libya had territorial claims against its neighbors. One result was a split among the rebels: radical Islamists formed a separate organization, while Libya-oriented communists formed the Chadian National Liberation Front under Goukouni Oueddei.
In 1973, taking advantage of the infighting in Chad and securing Oueddei’s consent, Libya annexed the Aouzou Strip, a region rich in uranium and oil. The basis for this was an unfulfilled Italo-French treaty from 1935 concerning the transfer of the Aouzou territory to Tripolitania, which was then an Italian colony.
In October 1975, a military coup led to the fall of Chad’s Christian government, replaced by the Muslim regime of General Félix Malloum. The French withdrew all their units from Chad. However, the new authorities quickly re-established contact with the former metropolis, and by April 1976, Chad acquired its own combat aviation. These were the same French “Skyraiders,” six of which formed the offensive component of the Chadian Air Force.
Naturally, Chad had no pilots of its own, and French mercenaries flew the attack aircraft. Even their flight objectives remained the same: the rebels of Goukouni Oueddei (1st People’s Army of FROLINAT) and Hissène Habré (2nd Northern Army of FROLINAT). A situation “normal” for Africa arose where both FROLINAT wings continued fighting the central government, each other, the Islamist Front for Joint Action of Ahmed Acyl, and Hissène Habré also fought the Libyans.
Although Habré and his army soon sided with Malloum, Oueddei’s rebels continued to advance toward the capital, N’Djamena. The rebels’ successful actions once again forced the French to intervene. To save the regime, France deployed 2,500 legionnaires to Chad in April 1978, and eight “Jaguar” fighter-bombers flew to N’Djamena airfield.
These aircraft were actively used to support the French offensive against the rebels. This activity led to the loss of one aircraft on May 31, shot down by a “Strela” MANPADS. Soon after, another “Jaguar” went missing during a combat sortie. Nevertheless, despite Libyan aid to the rebels, the French army’s intervention allowed them to be pushed back from the capital.
In December of the same year, despite all French efforts, the fragile alliance between Habré and Malloum collapsed. A real massacre unfolded in the streets of N’Djamena between armed Arabs from the North and black Christians of the Chadian army. Taking advantage of the chaos, units of the Nigerian army entered the western border regions, allegedly to prevent further expansion by Gaddafi.
Only in February of the following year did Chadian Army Commander Colonel Abd El Kader Kamougué manage to stop the fighting and bring all local “authorities” to the negotiating table. The result of months of bargaining was the proclamation of Goukouni Oueddei as President of Chad on November 11, 1979. Colonel Abd El Kader Kamougué became Vice-President, and the second rebel leader, Hissène Habré, became Minister of Defense.
However, all armed formations were not disbanded but remained under the command of their leaders. Nigerian troops remained the guarantors of the agreements reached. But, as is well known, “spiders in a jar cannot coexist,” and soon fighting resumed between the factions of the former rebels. France, seeing its inability to resolve the problem, withdrew and evacuated its troops from the conflict zone. Already in October, the armed forces of the North launched a large-scale offensive on the capital, while Libyan bombs simultaneously rained down on the city.
On October 9, 1980, several Tu-22s, at Oueddei’s request, struck Hissène Habré’s unit positions near N’Djamena. This was followed by attacks by Libyan Tu-22s and “Mirages” on other targets. Foreign military advisors serving in the Libyan Air Force participated in the raids. It should be noted that due to a shortage of flight personnel, North Koreans, Pakistanis, Syrians, and even East Germans flew Libyan aircraft.
According to Western sources, Soviet instructors were also present in Chad. This fact is confirmed by official data from the General Staff of the Russian Federation, stating that “25 representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense visited Chad during 1976-78,” though their direct participation in combat operations is not proven.
Direct fire support for Oueddei’s troops and the Libyan Pan-African Legion (4,000 men with tanks and artillery) in the battles for N’Djamena was provided by Mi-24 combat helicopters and trainer aircraft adapted for ground attack. Soon, Hissène Habré’s defeated units retreated to the Sudanese border. During battles in the border zone, Libyan SF-260s, disregarding international norms, struck Sudanese towns and villages serving as bases for Habré’s forces.
The Sudanese claimed that two such aircraft were shot down during raids on the town of Koloous, with both pilots killed. Concerned about a potential threat to Egypt and Sudan, the Americans deployed a pair of E-3A AWACS to Cairo West airfield, monitoring the situation in the region. Simultaneously, a scandal erupted in the United States: journalists “uncovered” that a former CIA agent (are there “former agents”?) had organized the recruitment of mercenary pilots for the Libyan Air Force. Although American mercenaries only flew CH-47 “Chinook” and C-130 transport aircraft, this was nevertheless happening in Chad. Furthermore, subsequent investigation revealed that this dealer managed to sell several “Hercules” aircraft to the Libyans, somehow circumventing the American arms embargo on the Gaddafi regime.
International Operations and Habré’s Rise
A ceasefire was signed in Chad on December 16. Under strong political pressure from France, the Libyans withdrew their troops from Chad. Units of “inter-African security forces” commanded by Nigerian Major General Ejiga were stationed between the opposing sides’ positions. This force included two thousand Nigerians, two thousand Zairians, and 800 Senegalese. From the air, this contingent was supported by five Zairian MB.326s and “Turbo Porters,” all piloted by the same mercenaries.
The corps was intended to end the civil war, but this did not happen. The parties used the lull to mobilize fighters and replenish their arsenals. Within a year, Habré, with the support of France and some Arab regimes, formed a new army.
Thus, after a year-long truce, Hissène Habré’s forces launched a successful offensive from the Sudanese border in late 1981. The role of the Chadian “Skyraiders” at this stage of the war is not entirely clear. It is unknown if they were based in N’Djamena and used against Habré, as French mercenaries flew them and could have either flown the planes to Habré or left N’Djamena themselves. One thing is certain: in 1982, the four remaining airworthy aircraft were decommissioned and sold to French collectors.
In June 1982, Habré’s forces pushed the enemy far to the north and captured N’Djamena, and the rebel leader declared himself President of Chad. Early the following year, Goukouni Oueddei’s army, with direct support from Libya, launched a counter-offensive from northern Chad. Fierce battles unfolded for the settlements of Fada, Faya-Largeau, Oum Chalouba, and Abéché.
Libyan aviation actively participated in the offensive, with Mi-24s (specifically their export modification, the Mi-25) distinguishing themselves. However, the scale of Libyan air operations was limited not so much by enemy air defense (equipped only with MANPADS and small arms) as by the lack of airfields for jet aircraft in the combat zone. Even during the fierce battle for the Faya-Largeau stronghold, only about 40 Libyan combat aircraft operated in Chad.
In these circumstances, Tu-22 strategic bombers again proved very useful. Taking off from northern Libya, they could easily reach any point in Chad. Given the remoteness of the theater of operations and the almost complete absence of a road network, transport aviation played a vital role in that war, bearing the main burden of logistical support for Libyan troops and their allies.
On August 6, 1983, the Libyans lost their first jet aircraft in Chad. On that day, during an attack on government troop positions by a group of 16 Su-22s, one aircraft was shot down by a well-aimed “Strela” MANPADS missile. The pilot, a major, reportedly ejected and was captured.
Wounded Chadian soldiers from battles in the north were transported to the capital by several DC-4 and C-54 transport planes, piloted by mercenaries. However, due to the Libyans’ absolute air superiority, these risky flights were carried out exclusively at night. Seeing that Hissène Habré’s Chadian army was once again losing the war, France again rushed to its ally’s aid, launching Operation Manta.
As part of the operation, six “Jaguar” aircraft from Squadron EC 3/11, four “Mirage” F.1C interceptors from EC 1/5, a pair of C-135F from ERV93, and two “Atlantique” maritime patrol aircraft arrived in N’Djamena on August 21, 1983. Simultaneously, Zaire’s army came to Habré’s aid. Thanks to this “international” effort, the Libyan advance was halted, and even some captured territories were recovered.
The arriving “Jaguar” aircraft initially did not participate in combat, only conducting patrol flights over Chad. They were supported by several “Gazelles” and three L-19s from army aviation. As always, the Americans also got involved. They organized an “air bridge” using massive C-141s to transport weapons and military equipment to N’Djamena for both the French and government troops.
Against this backdrop, a war unexpectedly erupted between Chad and Nigeria in May 1984, sparked by several small islands in the southeastern part of Lake Chad. Nigerian troops destroyed a Chadian garrison in a surprise attack, killing about 300 soldiers. In response, French mercenaries slaughtered Nigerian military personnel, preventing them from establishing a foothold on the islands.
Enraged Nigerian generals ordered the launch of a large-scale military operation. During its preparation, Nigerian Air Force MiG-21s began bombing Chadian villages. However, the war ended as suddenly as it began. A ceasefire agreement was signed in July, and the islands were forgotten again. On January 24, 1984, during an attack on a rebel convoy, another “Jaguar” was shot down by 23mm anti-aircraft fire; according to other sources, a “Strela” MANPADS crew achieved the victory. On April 16, Chadian soil received the wreckage of another French attack aircraft, but this was most likely due to an accident.
In October 1986, Gaddafi increased his contingent in Chad to four thousand men. Two months later, Libyan troops and Oueddei’s army crossed the “red line” (the opponents’ contact zone) along the 16th parallel and began advancing towards the capital. Habré once again called on the French for help. Paris did not delay, and the General Staff developed Operation Epervier (“Sparrowhawk”).
According to the former metropolis’s order, “Jaguar” aircraft, taking off from Central African bases, launched a powerful bombing raid on Libyan positions, significantly cooling the ardor of the advancing forces. The main target of the raids was the large Ouadi Doum airfield, where most of the Libyan expeditionary corps’ aircraft were concentrated.
However, this “warning” only lasted two months, and by December, Libyan troops, with the participation of Soviet military advisors, launched their third offensive of the year along the entire front line. This time, napalm was used, as well as the main trump card—the Tu-22. Some Western sources even claimed chemical weapons were used. Frightened by this turn of events, the French deployed several “Hawk” SAM system crews to the capital using American “Galaxy” transport planes.
For the first time in the entire campaign, the government army offered serious resistance; in the battle for the town of Bardai alone, the Libyans lost 400 killed and 20 tanks. Soon, the attackers were repelled. This was largely facilitated by active French assistance, who parachuted weapons and ammunition to their supporters.
On January 2, 1987, Habré’s army launched a counter-offensive and recaptured the town of Fada from the enemy. Approximately 700 Libyans died in the fighting, and on January 3, an Mi-25 was shot down in the area.
Meanwhile, France and the US increased aid to Habré, and French Air Force “Jaguar” aircraft began regular reconnaissance flights, preparing a new strike on Ouadi Doum. On January 7, ten “Jaguar” aircraft, taking off from N’Djamena, struck Libyan radars in the vicinity of the airbase using “Martel” anti-radar missiles. The results of the operation were not reported, but it is known that this raid was the last action by “Jaguar” aircraft during Operation Epervier.
Simultaneously, France increased its military presence in Chad, deploying an additional 1,000 soldiers and augmenting its air group in the region to two squadrons. It now included 30 “Jaguar” and “Mirage” F-1C combat aircraft. “Mirage-3” and “Atlantique” aircraft were used for reconnaissance. The expeditionary forces’ operations were supported by a dozen C-135R and C-160 transport aircraft. Their bases included airfields in N’Djamena (Chad), Libreville (Gabon), and Bouar and Bangui (Central African Republic).
After the capture of Fada, prisoners were paraded through the streets of N’Djamena, and an exhibition of captured Libyan weapons of Soviet and Czechoslovak manufacture was set up in the central square. On March 8, Habré’s troops launched an offensive on Ouadi Doum and after fierce fighting, captured the airbase on March 22. Trophies included three Mi-25s, eleven L-39s, and two SF.260s. An enraged Gaddafi ordered Ouadi Doum to be bombed. Several Tu-22s launched a bombing raid on the airfield, but the result was negligible.
On August 8, the Chadian army captured the airfield in the Libyan-annexed Aouzou Strip, where, among other things, an Mi-25 was burned on the ground. The Libyan army made persistent attempts to recapture Aouzou, widely using aviation. According to official Chadian data, the country’s air defense, primarily equipped with captured “Strela” MANPADS and “Kub” SAMs, claimed nine Libyan aircraft and helicopters between August 17 and 23, including a Tu-22 and an Mi-25 shot down on August 17.
On September 5, Habré’s forces routed the Maaten al-Sarra airbase, already inside Libyan territory. Chadian anti-aircraft gunners shot down three MiGs and one Mi-25, whose crew perished. Another 22 aircraft and helicopters were destroyed on the ground.
Two days later, Colonel Gaddafi, in retaliation, ordered a bombing raid on the Chadian capital. On the morning of September 7, French radar detected unknown aircraft flying over Nigeria that did not respond to operators’ queries. Two “Mirage” aircraft were scrambled from N’Djamena airfield to intercept.
Since the unknown aircraft did not violate Chadian airspace, the pilots could not attack the enemy. When the aircraft approached Lake Chad, which borders Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon, N’Djamena’s air defense was put on alert. At 6:59, one of the aircraft was hit by a “Hawk” SAM missile. Subsequent investigation revealed it was a Libyan Air Force Tu-22.
Soon after the defeat of the Libyan army in battles in northern Chad and southern Libya, the parties signed a ceasefire agreement, which, despite isolated clashes, was generally observed. Western sources reported the following losses of Libyan aviation in the Chadian war: two Tu-22s, two MiG-23s, one MiG-25, two An-26s, seventeen SF-260s, fifteen L-39s, and eleven Mi-25s. Other researchers cite figures of 28 aircraft destroyed and 23 captured, including three Mi-25s and eleven L-39s. However, these figures cannot be taken as absolute truth. For example, it is known for certain that at least one Su-22 was lost, which was not included in any of the Western-published lists of Libyan losses.
The peaceful “lull” in Chad did not last long. Already in April 1989, two high-ranking army officers, Hassan Djamous and Idriss Déby, supported by Interior Minister Brahim Mahamat Itno, organized an anti-government conspiracy. This plot was, however, uncovered. Only Déby managed to escape, while the other conspirators were executed. Déby, abroad, became very active and created the Movement for Chadian National Salvation.
In the autumn of 1990, fighters of this movement launched an offensive and quickly captured the capital. On December 1, Hissène Habré requested political asylum in Cameroon. Déby formed a new government and, naturally, became president. He proclaimed a pro-Libyan orientation for his policies. Thus, Gaddafi finally achieved what he had failed to do during the bloody war: he turned Chad into his sphere of influence.
Habré, meanwhile, did not accept defeat. In 1992, two military revolts, instigated by the former president against the current one, broke out one after another. Both were suppressed, with aviation playing a significant role. As of 2000, the Chadian Air Force’s strike component consisted of a pair of “Alouette” III helicopters, two armed PC-7s, and two SF.260s, all received from the Libyans.
Transport aviation boasted several An-26s, also transferred by Gaddafi, and one C-130 “Hercules.” In 1990, two such aircraft were bought in Portugal, but the second was soon dismantled for spare parts. The tense internal and external situation, however, demanded urgent modernization of the armed forces. In 2001, two Mi-17s and two Mi-24Vs were cheaply purchased from Ukraine. Who flies these machines is not reliably known.
Another surge of hostilities in the country occurred in early spring 2006. The Sudanese-backed rebel leader of the “United Front for Change,” Ali Kedelaye, began active military operations. In a short time, the rebels captured the city of Mongo, located 400 km east of the capital, N’Djamena. On April 13, battles unfolded in the vicinity of the capital. Western news agencies noted the use of tanks and helicopters in the fighting.
The US and UN evacuated diplomatic missions. France condemned any attempts to seize power by force in Chad. However, the French military contingent in the country, it was reported, would not intervene in the hostilities. The military was only prepared to ensure the possible evacuation of French citizens.